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Erin Kendall Braun 
 
A fundamental question in the study of memory is: Why do we remember some events 
but forget others? It has been proposed that people preferentially remember 
motivationally relevant information, as these memories may be useful in guiding choices 
in the future, a framework called adaptive memory. This dissertation examined the brain 
mechanisms that support adaptive memory, specifically focusing on how memory is 
shaped by rewards and dopamine, using a combination of pharmacological manipulations 
and behavioral assays. First, we found that rewards retroactively prioritize memory for 
preceding neutral events, and consistent with models of hippocampal replay, two periods 
of consolidation are necessary for this effect: a period of rest immediately following 
encoding and overnight consolidation. Second, motivated by research showing that 
neurotransmitters, such as dopamine, potentiate motivationally relevant memories to 
endure over long durations, we administered d-amphetamine (a dopamine agonist) before 
encoding. We found that when hippocampus dependent memory is tested after a short 
delay, working memory best accounts for memory performance, but when tested after a 
long delay, d-amphetamine level directly predicts memory performance. And third, we 
tested how d-amphetamine modulates different memory systems after a delay, using two 
different behavioral paradigms in which participants learned about overlapping 
associations using either stimulus-response learning or deliberate associative encoding. In 
both experiments, we found that d-amphetamine during encoding enhanced test 
performance on the trained items a week later; however, we did not detect any evidence 
that d-amphetamine modulates the integration of the overlapping pairs. Together, the 
work reported in this dissertation suggests that memory for motivationally relevant 
information is prioritized, dopamine enhances performance across different memory and 
learning systems, the effect of both reward and dopamine on memory and learning 
emerge after consolidation, and dopamine does not bias the hippocampus to encode 
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Of the many things that you experience on any given day – your commute in the 
morning, the trip to the grocery store, a dinner at that great new restaurant – only a small 
proportion will be remembered tomorrow, and even fewer a year from now.  A 
fundamental question in the study of memory is why we remember some events and 
forget others, and what neural mechanisms determine what is remembered and what is 
forgotten. 
 
 It has been proposed that people preferentially remember motivationally relevant 
information, such as the experiences that led to a rewarding outcome (e.g., finding a great 
new restaurant), because these memories may be the most useful in guiding choices in the 
future, an concept referred to as adaptive memory.  
 
Cognitive neuroscience experiments in humans are constrained – and rightfully so – by 
ethical considerations that prohibit many invasive experimental techniques that could be 
used to understand the relationship between the cognitive and brain processes that 
support adaptive memory selection. Given these limitations, I have designed my research 
program to explicitly build upon extensive research studying the effects of reward and 
dopamine on memory in cellular and animal models and then extend this research to 
humans. My approach has been to generate predictions about the effects of rewards and 
dopamine on memory from the non-human literature, which I then test in humans. 
Therefore, the research presented in this dissertation combines behavioral paradigms, 
designed to test precise behavioral predictions with pharmacology, to directly test the 
effect of neurotransmitters on memory.  
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Before describing this research in detail, I will provide an overview of relevant 
background literature, focusing on the findings that inspired the research included in this 
dissertation. Particular attention will be paid to research on memory and motivation, 
along with their neural underpinnings. This research uses the framework of adaptive 
memory, which suggests that motivationally relevant memories are remembered better to 
guide choices in the future, so these memories must endure over the long term.   
 
How are memories remembered?  
 
The hippocampus plays a critical role in long-term memory. This has been known since 
the pivotal case study of H.M., a patient who experienced profound amnesia after having 
his hippocampi and the surrounding areas of the medial temporal lobe resected (Squire, 
2009; Scoville & Milner, 1957). The hippocampus has specifically been linked to 
episodic memory, which refers to memories of an particular sequence of events that occur 
at an explicit time and place (Burgess, Maguire, & O'Keefe, 2002; Tulving & 
Markowitsch, 1998).  
 
Relational encoding How does the hippocampus support episodic memory? One 
prominent theory identified that a common feature underlying the episodic and spatial 
memory tasks impaired with hippocampal lesions, which ranged from episodic memory 
to spatial memory, is that they all involved remembering the relationships between 
features. According to this theory, called relational encoding, one of the fundamental 
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computations performed by the hippocampus is binding aspects or features of the 
environment together (Eichenbaum, 2000; 2004). This idea suggests that when the 
hippocampus encodes an episodic memory, it takes all of the aspects of an event – the 
location, the people involved, the objects present, the actions taken – and connects or 
binds these elements together over time and space to form the memory. For example, 
remembering a recent trip to the grocery store involves remembering the store, the 
arrangement of foods within the store, the sequence of events – first finding tomatoes, 
then grabbing basil, then choosing a cheese – and binding these features across space and 
time (Monti et al., 2014). The relational encoding hypothesis is well supported by 
experiments from animal lesion studies (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997), human lesion 
studies (Hannula, Tranel, & Cohen, 2006; Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow, & Cohen, 2016) and 
fMRI in healthy adults (Staresina & Davachi, 2009). Given that the ability to form 
flexible relational memories depends on the hippocampus, one common way to test 
hippocampus dependent memory in humans is to ask participants to deliberately 
memorize relationships between stimuli and then test memory for those associations (e.g. 
Cohn, Moscovitch, 2007, 2007).  
 
Integration Many experiences share overlapping features. For example, every airline 
flight consists of going to the airport, getting through security, finding your gate, and 
boarding the plane. These shared features may result in the hippocampus representing 
these separate events in an integrated manner. As such, the representations for the related 
features may be shared by both memory representations, potentially forming indirect 
relational links between these distinct events. Integrated memories may help to guide 
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future behavior by facilitating generalization in novel situations (Duncan, Tompary, & 
Davachi, 2014; Shohamy & Daw, 2015); for example, even at a new airport, once you get 
through security, you know to look for your gate. But maladaptive memory integration 
may also cause specific memory mistakes (Duncan & Schlichting, 2018), in which 
aspects of separate but related experiences are confused, such as when you mistakenly 
expect to find a favorite coffee shop at the wrong New York City airport. Therefore, 
sometimes it is preferential to encode events as being distinct to minimize memory errors 
and overgeneralization. Previous research has demonstrated memory integration in 
humans, and evidence from both fMRI and patients with impaired hippocampal function 
(Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997; Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, & Cohen, 2007; Myers et al., 2006; 
Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012; Zeithamova & Preston, 2010) 
suggests that the hippocampus plays a crucial role in both encoding distinct events and 
integrating across memory. But, an important outstanding question is to understand the 
mechanisms that bias the hippocampus to preferentially encode related memories as 
relatively distinct or integrated memories.  
 
How do rewards modulate memory? 
 
Although a great deal is known about the hippocampus supports relational memoy 
encoding, this framework does not explain why some events are remembered and others 
forgotten. While emotions and affect broadly signal motivational relevance and modulate 
memory (Goldfarb & Phelps, 2017; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Mather & Sutherland, 
2011; McGaugh, 2013; Ritchey, Murty, & Dunsmoor, 2016; Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015), 
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given extensive research in animal and cellular models studying the effect of reward and 
the related neurotransmitter, dopamine, on memory (Bethus, Tse, & Morris, 2010; 
Brzosko, Schultz, Paulsen, & Bartos, 2015; Lisman, Grace, & Duzel, 2011; Rossato, 
Bevilaqua, Izquierdo, Medina, & Cammarota, 2009a; Shires, Da Silva, Hawthorne, 
Morris, & Martin, 2012), the work presented in this dissertation will focus on the 
motivational effect of rewards on memory. Rewards are often used to manipulate 
motivation experimentally, and consequently, I will review research on reward and 
memory below.  
 
One of the earliest studies to show that the anticipation of rewards enhances memory 
consisted of a task in which a subset of stimuli were cued to be worth more money if they 
were correctly remembered. For remembered items, fMRI results showed greater BOLD 
activity in the hippocampus, and the “reward” areas of the midbrain and nucleus 
accumbens, for the high vs. low motivation conditions, providing indirect evidence that 
rewards modulate memory (Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & 
Gabrieli, 2006), see also (Wittmann, Bunzeck, Dolan, & Duzel, 2007; Wittmann, Dolan, 
& Duzel, 2011). This finding is consistent with predictions that rewards modulate 
memory through dopaminergic activity (Shohamy & Adcock, 2010); however, these 
results leave open questions about the mechanisms by which reward modulates memory, 
as these experiments could not measure dopamine activity directly.  
 
One possible concern for these motivationally modulated memories is that all of the 
effects may be due to motivation modulating attention, instead of having a direct effect 
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on memory. However, subsequent studies have shown that rewards can retroactively 
enhance memory (Murayama & Kuhbandner, 2011; Patil, Murty, Dunsmoor, Phelps, & 
Davachi, 2017), suggesting that rewards modulate memory independently of simply 
modulating attention. Relatedly, further experiments have investigated how reward 
prediction errors – that is dopaminergic signals that signal the difference between an 
expected outcome and the actual outcome – modulate memory, but the results are 
inconsistent across experiments. For example, although one experiment has detected that 
the magnitude of the prediction error is critical to modulate memory (Rouhani, Norman, 
& Niv, 2018), other experiments have shown that only positively signed prediction errors 
modulate memory (Jang, Nassar, Dillon, & Frank, 2018). Therefore, future research will 
be required to disentangle the relative effects of each component.  
 
How are motivationally relevant memories selected for prioritization?  
 
Extensive evidence demonstrates that motivationally relevant memories are remembered 
better, but an open question is the mechanism by which these memories are selected to be 
consolidated into memory to be remembered over long delays. One suggestion is that 
neurotransmitters, such as dopamine, may play an important role by signaling which 
memories are important. Dopamine is primarily implicated in signaling unpredicted 
reward outcomes, things that predict reward (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Bromberg-
Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010; O'Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 
2003; Rutledge, Dean, Caplin, & Glimcher, 2010; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997), 
and other motivationally relevant events, such as novelty, salience, aversive events 
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(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010) and other deviations from expectations (Gershman & 
Schoenbaum, 2017). Given that there are dopaminergic projections from the midbrain to 
the hippocampus (Lisman & Grace, 2005)1, it is possible that dopaminergic input from 
the midbrain signals motivational relevance in the hippocampus, and this signal facilitates 
the selection of memories for long term storage (Lisman et al., 2011; Rogerson, Cai, 
Frank, Sano, Shobe, Lopez-Aranda, & Silva, 2014a). 
 
Evidence from hippocampal slice recording is congruent with this hypothesis and 
suggests that dopamine may induce synaptic changes that facilitate the consolidation of 
motivationally relevant memories to be remembered over long delays. For example, a 
series of experiments examining the effect of dopamine on long term potentiation (LTP) 
in slice recordings has shown that dopamine modulates LTP (Lemon & Manahan-
Vaughan, 2006; S. Li, Cullen, Anwyl, & Rowan, 2003; Redondo & Morris, 2011). 
However, the effects of dopamine are not immediately apparent and instead emerge only 
after a delay (Bethus et al., 2010; U. Frey & Morris, 1997). Later studies demonstrated 
that these effects were due to dopamine enhancing late-phase LTP, a different mechanism 
of potentiation that involves protein synthesis, and thus the changes do not emerge 
immediately (E. P. Huang, 1998). Therefore, there is a tradeoff between early-phase LTP, 
which emerges rapidly but does not endure, and late-phase LTP, which emerges only 
after a delay but results in more stable synaptic changes.  
 
																																																								
1 Recent research suggests that noradrenergic projections from the locus coeruleus to the 
hippocampus may also play an important role modulating motivationally relevant 
memories (Kempadoo, Mosharov, Choi, Sulzer, & Kandel, 2016; Smith & Greene, 2012; 
Takeuchi et al., 2016). 
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Together, this body of research has led to the suggestion that dopamine mediates the 
“synaptic tag and capture” of memories, including protein-synthesis dependent long-term 
potentiation of memories facilitating the long lasting change in protein efficacy (Redondo 
& Morris, 2011; Rogerson, Cai, Frank, Sano, Shobe, Lopez-Aranda, & Silva, 2014a; 
Shires et al., 2012). However, open questions remain about how dopamine modulates 
hippocampus dependent memories in humans and the pathways by which dopamine 
modulates memories when memory is tested after a short versus long delay.  
 
How do post-encoding mechanisms modulate memory? 
 
Open questions remain about how motivationally relevant memories are differentially 
consolidated via post-encoding mechanisms. There is extensive evidence from rodents 
(O'Keefe, 1976; 1979), as well as bats (Yartsev & Ulanovsky, 2013) and humans 
(Ekstrom, Kahana, Caplan, & Fields, 2003), that specialized neurons in the hippocampus 
specifically code for spatial location, firing selectively to a space or spaces within the 
environment. Subsequent research has shown that these so-called “place cells” also fire 
selectively to features along other non-spatial, task relevant dimensions, such as time, 
acoustic frequencies or other animals (Aronov, Nevers, & Tank, 2017; Eichenbaum, 
2014; Kraus, Robinson, White, Eichenbaum, & Hasselmo, 2013; MacDonald, Carrow, 
Place, & Eichenbaum, 2013; Omer, Maimon, Las, & Ulanovsky, 2018).   
 
A later discovery showed that these place cells, which had previously been observed to 
fire with correspondence to the animal’s actual location, also replay sequences of events 
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that had previously occurred, both during slow wave sleep (Ji & Wilson, 2007a; Wilson 
& McNaughton, 1994b) and during periods of rest that immediately followed encoding. 
Hippocampal replay immediately following encoding tends to occur in reverse (Diba & 
Buzsáki, 2007; Foster & Wilson, 2006), starting from the current location and rewinding 
to previous locations, while replay during sleep tends to occur in the forward direction 
(Wikenheiser & Redish, 2013). Critically, hippocampal replay at both of these time 
points is important for subsequent memory: eliminating replay at either time results in 
impaired memory performance during later test (Girardeau, Benchenane, Wiener, 
Buzsáki, & Zugaro, 2009; Jadhav, Kemere, German, & Frank, 2012), suggesting that the 
replay is a critical component of memory consolidation (Carr, Jadhav, & Frank, 2011; 
Girardeau & Zugaro, 2011; O'Neill, Pleydell-Bouverie, Dupret, & Csicsvari, 2010; 
Wikenheiser & Redish, 2012).  
 
Importantly, hippocampal replay at both time windows – immediately after encoding and 
during sleep – seems to be linked to both dopamine and reward. For example, the rate of 
(reverse) replay immediately following a reward is greater following mazes ending with 
high versus low rewards (Ambrose, Pfeiffer, & Foster, 2016; Singer & Frank, 2009). 
Simultaneous recordings in rodents show that upon receipt of a reward, neurons in the 
midbrain and the hippocampus fire in tandem (Gomperts, Kloosterman, Wilson, & 
Eichenbaum, 2015), which may provide a mechanism by which reward information is 
back-propagated to the proceeding experiences (Atherton, Dupret, & Mellor, 2015; 
Foster & Wilson, 2006) that may be used to predict reward in the future. Additionally, 
optogenetic manipulation of dopamine neurons during encoding has been shown to 
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increase the amount of corresponding replay during sleep (McNamara, Tejero-Cantero, 
Trouche, Campo-Urriza, & Dupret, 2014). Through both of these mechanisms – replay 
immediately following encoding and replay during subsequent sleep – dopamine may 
enhance post-encoding consolidation activity and thus may provide a mechanism by 
which reward information modulates post-encoding consolidation activity to enhance 
memory for motivationally relevant experiences.  
 
Overview of questions addressed 
 
However, this research leaves open questions about how motivationally relevant 
memories are selectively remembered and change over consolidation. Specifically, within 
the context of reward modulated memory, questions remain about which memories are 
consolidated for future use, how these memories change over time, and the brain 
mechanisms that support memory selection and differential consolidation. The research 
included in this dissertation will explore these questions, using a combination of 
behavioral experiments and pharmacology. 
 
Chapter 2 developed a novel behavioral paradigm that featured rich spatio-temporal 
encoding to ask that mirrors the complexity of complex experience. Within this 
framework, we asked: Do rewards retroactively modulate memory, and if yes, which 
memories are retroactively modulated? Additionally, motivated by the two time periods 
of hippocampal replay that are important for memory consolidation in rodent models, the 
research presented in this chapter tested whether two time windows – a brief period of 
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rest immediately following encoding and overnight consolidation – are necessary to 
facilitate the retroactive enhancement of memory by reward.  
 
While research in animals and cellular models has demonstrated dopamine-mediated 
enhancement of memory, in humans, mostly only indirect evidence of this phenomena 
exists using methods such as fMRI. Consequently, Chapter 3 pharmacologically tested 
the effect of a dopamine agonist on hippocampus dependent associative encoding to ask: 
How do dopamine agonists modulate memory, both when memory is tested immediately 
and at a delay? Given that dopamine agonists also enhance executive functions, if there 
are effects of d-amphetamine on memory, are the effects caused by an indirect effect of 
working memory or due to a direct effect of d-amphetamine on memory? 
 
The research presented in Chapter 4 was designed to test two related questions: First, 
both striatum-dependent reward learning and hippocampus-dependent associative 
memory are modulated by dopamine; however, an open question remains about how 
dopamine modulates consolidation of this learning over time in each of these systems. 
Second, although previous research proposes that dopamine promotes hippocampal 
memory integration, there is little evidence that supports dopamine-mediated memory 
integration in humans. This chapter included two complementary behavioral paradigms 
that each involved learning about overlapping associations, with either stimulus-response 
learning or rich, deliberate encoding, to address the following questions: How does 
dopamine at encoding modulate learning for associations? And, separately, how does 
























Many decisions are based on an internal model of the world. Yet, how such a model is 
constructed from experience and represented in memory remains unknown. We test the 
hypothesis that reward shapes memory for sequences of events by retroactively 
prioritizing memory for objects as a function of their distance from reward. Human 
participants encountered neutral objects while exploring a series of mazes for reward. 
Across six datasets, we find that reward systematically modulates memory for neutral 
objects, retroactively prioritizing memory for objects closest to the reward. This effect of 
reward on memory emerges only after a 24-hour delay and is stronger for mazes followed 
by a longer rest interval, suggesting a role for post-reward replay and overnight 
consolidation, as predicted by neurobiological data in animals. These findings 
demonstrate that reward retroactively prioritizes memory along a sequential gradient, 








Decisions are shaped by memory for past experiences. There has been substantial 
progress in understanding the mechanisms by which the brain prioritizes memory for 
events that were themselves rewarding (Adcock et al., 2006; Gruber, Ritchey, Wang, 
Doss, & Ranganath, 2016; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010; Wittmann et al., 2007). However, 
for memory to be useful in guiding decisions, it is essential not only to remember an 
event that was rewarding, but also – perhaps even more so – the sequence of events that 
led to it. Indeed, many experiences unfold over multiple steps before a reward is obtained 
– such as when a rodent explores a maze for reward or when a person explores a new city 
for a café. This poses an interesting problem, because in such situations, memory for the 
reward itself is not enough to know which steps are necessary to obtain the reward in the 
future. Computational models and physiological data offer possible solutions to this 
problem, but the implications for human memory have remained untested. 
 
Computational models of goal-directed decision making have proposed a family of 
theories, known as model-based reinforcement learning, which evaluates actions by 
integrating information from a learned model of the environment (Daw, Gershman, 
Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; 
Shohamy & Daw, 2015). Memory is theorized to play a key role in such model-based 
behavior because it offers a mechanism for encoding the associative structure of the 
environment, essentially offering an answer to the critical question of how the model in 
model based decisions is constructed (Gershman & Daw, 2017; Graves et al., 2016; Mnih 
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et al., 2015; Stachenfeld, Botvinick, & Gershman, 2017; Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012). 
The hippocampus, known for its role in long-term episodic and spatial memory, is likely 
to contribute to the sort of structured associations that underlie the construction of a 
world model (Davachi, 2006a; Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997; Gershman & Daw, 2017; 
Konkel & Cohen, 2009; Miller, Botvinick, & Brody, 2017; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010; 
Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012). Moreover, theoretical work has suggested that the role of 
the hippocampus in building a world model may be specifically linked to its broader role 
in relational and temporal memories for individual events (Gershman, Moore, Todd, 
Norman, & Sederberg, 2012). However, it remains unknown whether and how memory 
for sequences of events is shaped by reward in humans.  
 
There is substantial evidence that reward prioritizes events for storage in long-term 
memory in both animals and humans. When the reward value of an upcoming event is 
known in advance, the beneficial effects of reward have been shown to be related to the 
anticipation of reward, before reward onset (Adcock et al., 2006; Wittmann et al., 2007). 
In many cases, however, the reward value is surprising and becomes known only 
afterwards. In such cases, effects of reward on memory must necessarily take place after 
encoding. Post-encoding and retroactive effects have been observed both in behavior, 
with the demonstration that motivationally relevant outcomes can retroactively affect 
events that preceded them (Dunsmoor, Murty, Davachi, & Phelps, 2015; Murayama & 
Kuhbandner, 2011; Patil et al., 2017), as well as in the responses of hippocampal neurons 
following reward (Ambrose et al., 2016; Singer & Frank, 2009). Following encoding, 
hippocampal neurons replay sequences of activity that reflect earlier encoding, a process 
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which is thought to result in physiological strengthening of the memory trace (Carr et al., 
2011; O'Neill et al., 2010; Roumis & Frank, 2015). Hippocampal replay often happens in 
reverse, beginning with the most recent events and playing back the trajectory from that 
point, rewinding the path that was taken.  Crucially, rewards have been shown to increase 
the amount of reverse replay, suggesting a mechanism by which rewards could 
selectively strengthen memory for the preceding neutral events (Ambrose et al., 2016; 
Singer & Frank, 2009).  
 
These data offer predictions about how reward could retroactively modulate sequences of 
events in humans and about which specific past events are likely to be prioritized in 
memory (Atherton et al., 2015; Johnson & Redish, 2007a; Ólafsdóttir, Barry, Saleem, 
Hassabis, & Spiers, 2015; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2014). Hippocampal replay following maze 
navigation in rodents has been shown to occur concurrently with the firing of midbrain 
dopamine neurons, potentially allowing reward information to back-propagate to more 
distal spatial locations or decision points that preceded it (Gomperts et al., 2015). This 
dopaminergic input may also selectively increase plasticity for the sequence of events 
that precede reward (Atherton et al., 2015; Brzosko et al., 2015). Together, these results 
suggest a mechanism by which reward could retroactively enhance memory for 
sequences of neutral events that preceded it and suggest that there should be a graded 
effect of reward on memory that would be strongest for those events closest in time and 
space to the reward itself.  
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The retroactive effects of reward on memory may require time for consolidation 
(Dunsmoor et al., 2015; Murayama & Kuhbandner, 2011; Patil et al., 2017). In humans, 
fMRI studies have shown that brain reactivation immediately following encoding predicts 
later long-term memory (Staresina, Alink, Kriegeskorte, & Henson, 2013; Tambini & 
Davachi, 2013; Tambini, Ketz, & Davachi, 2010), and extensive research has 
demonstrated the importance of sleep for memory consolidation, specifically for 
motivationally relevant information (Bendor & Wilson, 2012; Oudiette, Antony, Creery, 
& Paller, 2013; Payne, Stickgold, Swanberg, & Kensinger, 2008; Stickgold & Walker, 
2013). Similarly, in animals, post-encoding replay has been shown in periods of 
quiescence immediately following exploration (Ambrose et al., 2016; Foster & Wilson, 
2006; Singer & Frank, 2009) and also during sleep (Ji & Wilson, 2007a; Wilson & 
McNaughton, 1994b), and experiments have shown that replay at both time points is 
necessary for learning (Ego-Stengel & Wilson, 2009; Girardeau et al., 2009; Jadhav et al., 
2012). Such findings suggest that the time window immediately after reward receipt 
(seconds) as well as the longer time window during sleep after learning (hours) may work 
jointly to prioritize sequences of events that lead to subsequent reward. 
 
Collectively, these findings offer a unified framework that makes predictions about which 
particular events will be prioritized by reward and under which circumstances. Reward 
would be expected to prioritize memory for events in a sequence that are most proximal 
to the reward itself; these effects would be expected to depend on post-encoding 
processes and to emerge only after consolidation. Recent experiments in humans have 
demonstrated that motivationally relevant information modulates memory (Adcock et al., 
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2006; Murty, LaBar, & Adcock, 2012; Ritchey et al., 2016) and that post encoding 
processes may also support memory modulation (Craig, Dewar, Sala, & Wolbers, 2015; 
Dunsmoor et al., 2015; Gruber et al., 2016; Oudiette et al., 2013; Patil et al., 2017; Payne 
et al., 2008; Rudoy, Voss, Westerberg, & Paller, 2009; Schlichting & Preston, 2016; 
Staresina et al., 2013; Tambini et al., 2010; Tambini & Davachi, 2013). Yet, the critical 
prediction linking motivationally relevant outcomes and post-encoding consolidation to 
memory – specifically that reward will retroactively enhance memory for items as a 
function of their distance from the reward – has not been tested.  
 
Guided by this framework, we tested three hypotheses regarding the effect of reward on 
memory during sequential goal-directed exploration in humans. First, we hypothesized 
that reward will selectively enhance memory for sequences of events leading to reward, 
as a function of their proximity to the outcome. Second, we hypothesized that the 
enhancing effects of reward on memory will depend on consolidation and therefore will 
emerge only after a delay of 24-hours. Third, we hypothesized that retroactive effects of 
reward on memory will depend on processes occurring immediately after encoding and 
therefore predicted that the amount of time for rest immediately following sequences of 
exploration will modulate the effect of reward on memory.  
 
To test these predictions, we developed a task, shown in Figure 1, in which participants 
explored a series of grid mazes, one square at a time, searching for a hidden reward (a 
gold coin worth $1). Critically, during each navigational step, participants encountered an 
incidental, trial-unique object picture. To test the effect of reward on memory, we 
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manipulated the maze outcomes so that half of the mazes ended in reward and half ended 
without reward. Later, we administered a surprise recognition memory test for the objects 
to examine whether the maze outcome (reward or no reward) retroactively modulated 
memory for the preceding objects. Importantly, during maze exploration, which was 
when objects were encountered, participants did not know whether that maze would end 
in reward or not. Thus, any reward-based modulation of memory must occur retroactively 
and cannot be due to differences in navigation or attention. To test the effect of 
consolidation on reward-modulated memory, some participants completed the memory 
test 24-hours after encoding (24-hour condition), while others were tested 15-minutes 
after encoding (15-minute condition). Additionally, to test the effect of post-encoding 
processes immediately following encoding, we manipulated the amount of rest time (15, 
20, or 25 seconds) following each maze. Finally, we ran three additional control 





























Together, this series of studies reveals that reward systematically prioritizes memory for 
neutral objects, retroactively enhancing memory for objects closest to the reward. This 
a Phase 1: Maze exploration (incidental encoding)
Phase 2: Surprise memory test (15-min or 24-hour)c
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Phase 1: Single trial timingb
time
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effect of reward on memory selectively emerges after a 24-hour delay and is stronger for 
mazes followed by a longer rest interval, suggesting a role for post-reward replay and 
overnight consolidation. These findings demonstrate that reward retroactively prioritizes 
memory along a sequential gradient, consistent with the role of memory in supporting 




Retroactive prioritization of memory by reward after consolidation 
 
Our first hypothesis was that long-term memory would be prioritized for objects that 
were most proximal to the reward. Supporting this prediction, in Experiment 1, we found 
that when memory was tested after 24 hours of consolidation, reward had a retroactive 
and selective effect on memory as a function of proximity of the objects to reward (multi-
level logistic regression; 24-hour condition (n = 23): reward x proximity: β=-0.11, 
SE=0.035, CI95=[-0.18, -0.036], p=0.004). Specifically, the closer an object was to the 
reward, the more likely it was to be remembered later, as shown in Figure 2a (see also 
Supplementary Figure 1a, Supplementary Figure 2a,c, Supplementary Note 1). This 
interaction reflected a negative effect of proximity on memory in the rewarded mazes but 
not the non-rewarded mazes (multi-level logistic regression; proximity: reward mazes: 
β=-0.16, SE=0.049, CI95=[-0.25, -0.065], p<0.0004; no reward mazes: β=-0.054, 
SE=0.045, CI95=[-0.32, 0.14], p=0.23). Together, these findings indicate that the reward-
driven reprioritization of memory varies as a function of the proximity of an object 
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relative to the reward: the more proximal an object was to reward, the more likely it was 
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In Experiment 2, we repeated the 24-hour condition of Experiment 1 in a new and 
separate sample of participants. The retroactive and graded effect of reward on memory 
was replicated (multi-level logistic regression; Experiment 2 (n=21): reward x proximity: 
β=-0.12, SE=0.033, CI95=[-0.18, -0.059], p=0.004; proximity: reward mazes: β=-0.15, 
SE=0.048, CI95=[-0.25, -0.050], p=0.00080; no reward mazes: β=0.098, SE=-0.052, 
CI95=[-0.0053, 0.20], p=0.066); see Supplementary Figure 1b and Supplementary Figure 
3a, Supplementary Note 1). Experiment 3 sought to further replicate the reward proximity 
effect and to determine whether the result was affected by the location of the outcome. 
Specifically, in Experiments 1 and 2, on reward trials the gold coin was presented inside 
the maze, while on no reward trials, the “maze over” outcome was presented outside of 
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the maze. Consequently the reward proximity effect could simply have been caused by 
the outcome location and not reward per se. In Experiment 3, we repeated the 24-hour 
condition of Experiments 1 and 2, but controlled for the location of the maze outcome: 
either a high reward (a gold coin worth $1) or low reward (a dime worth $0.10) was 
always presented in a maze square. When controlling for the location of the maze 
outcome, we again found the reward proximity effect (multi-level logistic regression; 
Experiment 3 (n = 32): reward x proximity: β=-0.12, SE=0.027, CI95=[-0.17, -0.071], p < 
0.0004; proximity: reward (gold coin) mazes: β=-0.16, SE=0.038, z=-4.15, CI95=[-0.24, -
0.085], p < 0.0004; low reward (dime) mazes: β=0.082, SE=0.038, z=2.17, CI95=[0.0084, 
0.16], p=0.030; see Supplementary Figure 1c and Supplementary Figure 3b, 
Supplementary Note 1). This indicates that the effect of reward on memory is not 
explained simply by differences in the maze outcome location but is due instead to 
retroactive reward modulation. 
 
Importantly, this effect of reward and proximity on memory cannot be explained by 
simple primacy or recency effects (i.e. improved memory for the first or last items), as 
memory was modulated by the interaction of relative proximity and reward, rather than a 
main effect of either (see Supplementary Note 2). Additionally, the reward proximity 
effect is not confounded by maze length, time elapsed between encoding and maze end, 
whether the reward stimulus was presented on the perimeter vs. inside of the maze, or the 
number of previous objects or rewards encoded in that maze square location (see 
Supplementary Note 2).  
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Our second hypothesis was that the effect of reward on memory would depend on 
consolidation. To test whether consolidation is necessary for the retroactive effect of 
reward on memory, we compared the data from participants who performed the memory 
test 24-hours after maze exploration with a separate group that performed the memory 
test 15-minutes after maze exploration. As shown in Figure 2, the reward x proximity 
interaction in the 24-hour group was significantly greater than in the 15-minute group 
(multi-level logistic regression; delay condition x reward x proximity: β=-0.061, 
SE=0.024, CI95=[-0.11, -0.013], p=0.012). Indeed, among those tested after 15-minutes, 
we found no interaction between reward and sequential proximity (multi-level logistic 
regression; 15-minute condition: reward x proximity: β=-0.014, SE=0.034, CI95=[-0.051, 
0.079], p=0.68; proximity: reward mazes: β=-0.039, SE=0.048, CI95=[-0.13, 0.058], 
p=0.41; no reward maze: β=-0.067, SE=0.054, CI95=[-0.17, 0.033], p=0.19; Figure 2b, 
see also Supplementary Figure 1, Supplementary Figure 2b,d and Supplementary Note 2). 
These results support the hypothesis that the retroactive effects of reward on proximal 
experiences emerge selectively after consolidation.   
 
Reward proximity effect increases with longer rest intervals 
 
Our third hypothesis was that the reward proximity effect would depend on processes that 
occur immediately after encoding, and therefore, we predicted that the amount of rest 
immediately following sequences of exploration would modulate the reward proximity 
effect on memory. To test this hypothesis, we examined whether the duration of rest 
following incidental encoding in each maze modulated the effect of reward and proximity 
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on memory. We manipulated the length of the post-encoding rest breaks to test if longer 
rest durations were associated with stronger retroactive reward modulation of memory for 
proximal objects. In the 24-hour condition, we found a significant interaction of 
proximity by reward by rest duration: for mazes followed by a longer break, the reward 
proximity effect was stronger (multi-level logistic regression; 24-hour condition: reward 
x proximity x rest duration: β=-0.12, SE=0.042, CI95=[-0.20, -0.036], p=0.0048; Figure 
3a). To further explore the effect of the rest duration interval in the delay condition, we 
compared model fits to the data. In a formal model comparison, we found that the model 
including rest duration explained the data significantly better than the simpler model 
omitting rest duration (chi-square test; χ2(8)=30.89, p=0.014). This effect was selective to 
the 24-hour condition (multi-level logistic regression; delay condition x reward x 
proximity x rest duration: β=-0.067, SE=0.031, CI95=[-0.13, -0.0054], p=0.033); we 
found no effect of rest duration on the reward proximity effect among the participants 
tested after 15-minutes (multi-level logistic regression; 15-minute condition (n = 21): 
reward x proximity x rest duration: β=0.012, SE=0.050, CI95=[-0.081, 0.12], p=0.74; 
Figure 3b). These results suggest that the rest breaks immediately following encoding are 
















These post-maze interval effects replicated in Experiment 2 (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward x proximity x rest duration: β=-0.14, SE=0.044, CI95=[-0.23, -0.062], 
p=0.0016; chi-square test; χ2(8)=33.50, p=0.000050; see Supplementary Figure 3b) and 
Experiment 3 (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity x rest duration: β = -
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0.018, SE = 0.035, z = -5.06, CI95=[-0.25, -0.11], p < 0.0004; chi-square test;  
χ2(8)=38.90, p=0.0000051)).  
 
Reward proximity effect is not due to strategic rehearsal 
 
Participants were not told of the memory tests before the maze exploration task. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the effect of reward on memory could be related to 
strategic rehearsal or other explicit post-reward processes during the rest breaks. That is, 
an alternative explanation for the reward proximity effect is that during the rest intervals 
participants rehearse objects more when they are recent and from rewarded mazes. To 
test this possibility, we ran a follow-up experiment that investigated whether the 
opportunity to strategically rehearse during the post-encoding rest breaks is related to the 
reward proximity memory effect. This experiment was identical to the 24-hour condition, 
except that participants performed a secondary distractor task during the post-encoding 
rest interval, designed to prohibit strategic rehearsal during this time.  
 
Participants were assigned to one of three conditions that varied the level of cognitive 
load of the distractor task (from low to high); this allowed us to test the effect of different 
levels of cognitive load during the rest interval on later memory. As shown in Figure 4, 
one group of participants performed a target detection task, a second group of participants 
performed a spatial navigation task, and a third group of participants performed a 
working memory task. In all three groups, we replicated the main findings of an 
interaction of proximity and reward: we found a graded and retroactive effect of reward 
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on memory after consolidation (multi-level logistic regression; target detection condition 
(n = 27): reward x proximity: β=-0.14, SE=0.029, CI95=[-0.19, -0.082], p<0.004; 
navigation condition (n = 27): reward x proximity: β=-0.15, SE=0.029, CI95=[-0.21, -
0.089], p<0.004; working memory condition (n = 23): reward x proximity: β=-0.13, 
SE=0.032, CI95=[-0.19, -0.064], p<0.004, for post hoc tests see Supplementary Table 3, 
see also Supplementary Note 1). The replication of this effect in all three conditions, even 
under challenging cognitive loads, suggests that the effect of reward on memory cannot 




Figure 4. Reward proximity effect is not due to strategic rehearsal. (Experiment 3) To 
rule out the possibility that the reward proximity effect was due to strategic rehearsal 
during the rest intervals, we conducted a follow-up experiment in which participants 
completed one of three distractor tasks during the rest breaks. (a) In the target detection 
condition (n = 27), participants were instructed to make a key response every time a 
target image appeared in a maze square, but not when a lure image (a dark grey square) 
appeared (top). Despite the distractor task, we found that rewards retroactively modulated 
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memory, such that participants were more likely to remember objects that were more 
proximal to the reward (bottom). (b) In the navigation condition (n = 27), participants 
used the arrow keys to navigate to a target (top). We again replicated the reward 
proximity effect. (c) In the working memory condition (n = 23), participants were 
presented with a target (a configuration of four randomly chosen colors in four randomly 
chosen squares) at the beginning of the rest interval and were instructed to make a key 
response to every presentation of this target configuration, but no responses to non-target 
configurations (other combinations of colors and squares) (top). In the working memory 
condition, we again replicated the reward proximity effect (bottom). We did not find a 
significant effect of distractor condition on the reward by proximity interaction (target 
detection condition vs. navigation condition x reward x proximity; target detection 
condition vs. working memory condition x reward x proximity (see Supplementary Table 
3a for post-hoc tests). The insets depict the beta coefficients for the reward and no reward 
conditions. The error bars represent the standard error of the reward x proximity 
interaction and the dot plot overlay shows the reward and no reward betas across 
participants. 
 
Further, in all three conditions, we again found that the retroactive reward proximity 
effect was related to the duration of post-maze rest: specifically, the longer duration of 
the post-maze interval was related to a stronger reward proximity effect, irrespective of 
the distractor task condition (see Supplementary Figure 4). Additionally, again we found 
that the model including rest duration explained object memory performance better than 
the model without rest both in the target detection and working memory conditions (chi-
square test; target detection: χ2(8)=39.86, p=0.0000034; working memory: χ2(8)=45.41, 
p=0.00000031) with a weaker effect in the same direction in the navigation condition 
(navigation: χ2(8)=13.57, p=0.094). These results replicate the previous finding that the 
duration of the post-maze rest period increases the reward by proximity interaction and 
demonstrate that the effect of rest duration on the reward proximity effect was not related 
to explicit rehearsal of objects during rest, as the effect was robust to three different 
distractor tasks during the rest period.  
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Retroactive prioritization of spatial memory by reward 
 
If rewards retroactively prioritize memory to facilitate future decisions, in addition to 
affecting memory for the object seen in each square, reward might also affect the location 
of each object, contributing to the formation of a cognitive map of the maze environment. 
To test the retroactive effect of reward on spatial memory, after participants completed 
the recognition memory test, we administered a surprise memory test for the objects’ 
spatial location during memory encoding (Phase 3). In the spatial location memory test, 
an old object was randomly placed in the maze and the participant was instructed to move 
the object back to the square where the object was originally encoded (Figure 5a). We 
then transformed the number of steps between the original (encoded) location and the 
remembered location into a continuous proportion correct measure (such that returning 
the object to the correct square was scored as a 1, and returning the object to a square as 
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We found that participants’ spatial memory performance was above chance (one sample 
t-test; chance = 0.5; data from all Experiments combined: mean spatial memory (se) = 
0.55 ± 0.00030, t(145)=13.35, p<0.001). Paralleling the results from the recognition 
memory test, we found that reward retroactively modulated spatial memory for 
sequentially proximal objects (multi-level logistic regression; data from Experiments 1, 2, 
3 and 4, combined: Reward x Proximity: β=-0.0062, SE=0.0022, t=-2.83, CI95 = [-0.010, 
-0.0018], p = 0.0032; Figure 5b), such that spatial location memory decreased as 
proximity to the end of the maze increased for the no (or low) reward mazes (multi-level 
logistic regression; Experiments 1-4 combined; 24-hour conditions only; n = 146: 
proximity – reward mazes: β=-0.0047, SE=0.0032, t=-1.48; proximity – no (or low) 
reward mazes: β=0.0076, SE=0.0031; t=2.41). Additionally, in this model, we detected a 
main effect of reward (multi-level logistic regression; data from all four experiments 
combined: β=0.0054, SE=0.0022, t=2.47, CI95 = [0.0011, 0.0095], p = 0.0032) such that 
spatial location memory for objects from rewarded mazes was significantly better than in 
the non-rewarded mazes. We found qualitatively similar results when we repeated these 
analyses measuring the memory performance in steps instead of the proportion correct 
measure (see Supplement). While these effects are small, in combination with the parallel 
	 35 
effects of reward on recognition memory, they suggest that spatial memory for the map 




Together, these findings demonstrate that both recognition memory and spatial memory 
for neutral events encountered during goal-directed exploration are retroactively 
modulated by reward. The retroactive effect of reward on memory was graded, such that 
the objects closest to the reward were remembered best, and these effects only emerged 
after 24-hours. Moreover, this selective prioritization of memory by reward was 
positively modulated by the duration of brief rest periods immediately following 
exploration. These effects were replicated in six separate data sets in which we also 
demonstrated that the reward proximity effect on memory was not due the location of the 
maze outcome or to active rehearsal during the post-encoding periods.  
 
Our finding that memory is biased by sequential distance from reward offers new insights 
into the mechanisms of both memory and decision making. First, our findings offer an 
important link between goal-directed exploration, memory, and reward. Second, our 
findings are consistent with the idea that memories do not form a veridical representation 
of the world but instead are systematically modulated by motivationally significant 
events. In offering an explanation as to how memories are prioritized, our findings 
address fundamental questions in memory research about what we remember and why. 
Our results specifically demonstrate that objects that were closest to reward outcomes 
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were retroactively prioritized in memory, rather than a general and immediate 
reprioritization of memory. This selective prioritization may help build world models that 
are well-suited to support adaptive behaviour by facilitating efficient, flexible, 
prospective choices in the future, such as finding a shortcut to get back to a rewarded 
location faster (Brown et al., 2016; Buckner, 2010; Dragoi & Tonegawa, 2013; George 
Dragoi, 2011; “Hippocampal Replay Is Not a Simple Function of Experience,” 2010; 
Johnson & Redish, 2007a; Ólafsdóttir et al., 2015; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2014; Redish, 2016; 
D. Silva, Feng, & Foster, 2015).  
 
These results raise questions about the specific brain mechanisms that facilitate the 
retroactive reward proximity effect. It is well established that the neurotransmitter 
dopamine signals unexpected rewards (Schultz et al., 1997) and other motivationally 
relevant events (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). Dopamine is also known to facilitate 
synaptic long-term potentiation, possibly through midbrain-hippocampal circuits (Bethus 
et al., 2010; Lisman et al., 2011; O'Carroll, Martin, Sandin, Frenguelli, & Morris, 2006; 
Rossato, Bevilaqua, Izquierdo, Medina, & Cammarota, 2009a; Shohamy & Adcock, 
2010). Our study further highlights the critical question of how unpredictable reward 
information could retroactively modulate memory traces for previously neutral 
information. In spatial navigation, hippocampal place cells replay the sequence of activity 
that unfolded during navigation during periods of rest that follow it (Nakashiba, Buhl, 
McHugh, & Tonegawa, 2009a; O'Neill et al., 2010; Pastalkova, Itskov, Amarasingham, 
& Buzsáki, 2008; Roumis & Frank, 2015), a process that is thought to facilitate memory 
consolidation (Carr et al., 2011). Replay activity has been linked to reward in previous 
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animal research in two ways: first, reward has been shown to increase reverse replay 
(Ambrose et al., 2016; Diba & Buzsáki, 2007; Foster & Wilson, 2006). Second, replay 
immediately following receipt of a reward in a maze has been shown to occur 
concurrently with the firing of midbrain dopamine neurons, potentially providing a 
mechanism for reward information to retroactively affect traces of the preceding spatial 
locations or decision points that preceded it (Gomperts et al., 2015). Together, these 
findings suggest a physiological mechanism by which reward could retroactively enhance 
memory for preceding sequences of neutral events. Our findings provide behavioural 
evidence in humans that is consistent with this mechanism, demonstrating that reward has 
a graded effect on memory, enhancing memory for events closer in time and space to the 
reward itself (Atherton et al., 2015).  
 
Replay findings in rodents also suggest that retroactive effects of reward on memory may 
require time for consolidation before their effects manifest in behaviour. In rodents, 
replay has also been shown in periods of quiescence immediately following exploration 
(Ambrose et al., 2016; Foster & Wilson, 2006; Singer & Frank, 2009) and also during 
sleep (McNamara et al., 2014). Studies suggest that replay at both time points is 
necessary for learning (Ego-Stengel & Wilson, 2009; Girardeau et al., 2009; Jadhav et al., 
2012). Therefore, the time window immediately after reward receipt (seconds) as well as 
the longer time window during sleep after learning (hours) may work jointly to prioritize 
sequences of events that led to subsequent reward. Our behavioural data are consistent 
with the hypothesis that replay that occurs immediately after encoding may tag events for 
later consolidation (Bethus et al., 2010; S. Frey & Frey, 2008; U. Frey & Morris, 1997; 
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Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 2011). Although each replay event may occur 
very rapidly, questions remain regarding the necessary and sufficient duration of rest and 
sleep post encoding. Our data suggest that the duration of the time window post encoding 
has an effect on later memory, even on the order of several seconds (ranging from 15 to 
25). Indeed, there is some evidence that both replay in rodents (Ambrose et al., 2016) and 
post-encoding reactivation in humans persist for prolonged durations following encoding 
(Staresina et al., 2013; Tambini et al., 2010; Tambini & Davachi, 2013). 
 
Finally, in addition to finding that memory is prioritized for items close to the reward, we 
also found some evidence for deprioritized memory for objects that were closest to the no 
reward (or low reward) outcomes – in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 and as a trend in 
Experiment 1. Although this finding was unexpected, it may be related to a recent report 
regarding the effects of reward on neuronal replay (Ambrose et al., 2016). Ambrose et al. 
found that increasing or decreasing reward led to corresponding changes in the rate of 
reverse replay, while the rate of forward replay remained unchanged. To the extent that 
similar processes may be happening in our task, this may help explain why reward vs. no-
reward outcomes would predominately affect memory for events at the beginning of the 
maze, rather than only at maze end, leading to a within-maze primacy effect for the no 
reward (or low reward) mazes. Further studies are needed to test this possibility directly. 
 
In summary, our findings demonstrate that motivationally relevant events retroactively 
prioritize memories for preceding neutral experiences along a temporal-spatial gradient. 
As such, our findings provide important support for mechanisms of memory in service of 
	 39 
decisions, and for how relational memory representations are modulated by reward to 






We designed Experiment 1 to answer three questions: 1. Do rewards exert a retroactive 
and graded effect on memory that varies as a function of the object’s sequential proximity 
to reward?, 2. Does the reward proximity effect depend on consolidation?, and 3. Do 
longer post-encoding rest intervals result in a greater reward proximity effect? To address 
these questions, we designed a task in which participants explored a series of mazes, half 
of which ended in reward and half of which ended with no reward. Critically, at each step 
of the maze participants were incidentally presented with pictures of trial-unique objects; 
in this way, objects varied in their proximity to the end of the maze (either reward or no 
reward). Then, either 15-minutes or 24-hours later, we gave a surprise recognition 
memory test for these objects. Since participants did not know the outcome of the maze at 
the time of incidental object encoding, any modulation of memory by reward is 
necessarily retroactive. 
  
Participants: We recruited and tested participants from the Columbia University 
community in accordance with a protocol approved by Columbia University’s 
Morningside Institutional Review Board. All participants provided informed consent. 
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Participants were excluded if they reported any psychiatric diagnoses and/or use of 
psychoactive medications, had previously participated in a similar experiment, were non-
compliant with the experimental protocol (e.g. did not show for the second session of the 
experiment), or if there were technical errors in data collection. Participants were 
compensated $12/hour for their time and were paid a cash bonus based on the number of 
gold coins found (unbeknownst to the participants, this was always one gold coin during 
the practice and 11 gold coins during the task, for $12 total).  
 
For Experiment 1, we recruited 51 participants. We excluded five participants due to 
technical errors, one participant for a self-reported psychiatric diagnosis and psychoactive 
medication, and one participant for previously participating in a similar task, leaving 44 
participants (29 female, mean age (SD): 24.6 ± 6.3 years). Of these participants, 23 were 
assigned to the 24-hour condition, and 21 were assigned to the 15-minute condition.  
 
Materials: We tested participants in individual testing rooms and presented the 
computerized tasks on a 21-inch iMac, using the Psychtoolbox (Brainard, D.H. (1997)) 
package in Matlab. Participants indicated their responses on a standard keyboard. The 
experiment included a total of 288 unique object pictures: 192 objects displayed during 
the maze exploration task and an additional 96 objects presented as lures for the 
subsequent memory task. The gold coin stimulus was a picture of the Liberty side of a 
United States Zachary Taylor gold dollar (image from the United States Mint) presented 
on a white background.  
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Procedure:  Participants completed the maze exploration incidental encoding task (Phase 
1; Figure 1a-b) and a surprise recognition memory test (Phase 2; Figure 1c), which began 
either 15-minutes or 24-hours after the maze exploration task.  
 
Phase 1 - Maze exploration (incidental encoding) task: The experimenter instructed 
participants that the goal of the task was to explore a series of mazes (5x5 grids) 
searching for a gold coin, each worth a $1 reward (see Supplementary Methods for 
instructions). Participants explored 22 mazes. Unbeknownst to them, we controlled the 
outcomes so that they found the gold coin in half of the mazes (11 reward mazes, 11 no 
reward mazes).  
 
Each maze began by displaying the 5x5 grid with all 25 locations filled with blank, grey-
patterned squares. The participants’ square location was indicated with a black frame. A 
square was randomly chosen for the participants’ start location; no object was revealed in 
this start square. Then participants freely navigated to an adjacent square – up, down, left 
or right – by pressing the corresponding arrow key. This choice shifted the black location 
frame to the selected location and revealed an object in that square. Each object was 
presented for 2.5 seconds, after which we replaced the object with a white square for 0-12 
seconds (jittered, mean 2 seconds). The next choice period was signalled by the square 
returning to the grey background colour, after which the participant had 2 seconds to 
choose where to move next. Participants were unaware that each maze had a 
predetermined length and outcome. After a participant explored the pre-allocated number 
of steps (i.e. squares explored or objects seen) for a given maze, he or she was presented 
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with the maze outcome: for rewarded mazes, this was a gold coin; for non-rewarded 
mazes, “MAZE OVER” appeared at top of the screen. The outcome (the gold coin or 
“MAZE OVER”) appeared for 2 seconds.  
 
To create a subjective sense of exploration, we varied the number of objects presented 
within each maze, such that participants saw 3-15 unique objects per maze (mean: 8.7 
objects), with lengths matched across the reward and no reward conditions. In total, 
participants were presented with 192 objects during the maze exploration phase. We 
pseudo-randomized the order of objects, maze lengths, and maze outcomes.  
 
Each maze was followed by a 15, 20, or 25 second rest break, designated by a fixation 
cross. Participants were instructed to rest during this time. Following the rest break, the 
next maze began automatically.  
 
If, within a particular maze, a participant re-explored a square, the same object was 
revealed so that the maze environment remained stable; however, we removed any object 
presented more than once from all analyses. If participants did not make a valid response 
within the allotted time (2 seconds), “Too Late” appeared at the top of the maze, and 
participants had to wait a full turn for their next move. Participants had a low rate of 
repeated objects (3.18 ± 3.29% of all trials on average) or “Too Late” missed trials (4.75 
± 5.04% of all trials on average). If participants tried to navigate outside of the maze, 
beyond the 5x5 grid, the response was not accepted.  
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At the beginning of the experiment, participants completed two practice mazes (one that 
ended with a gold coin and one that did not) with abstract shapes instead of objects. They 
were then paid a bonus $1 for the gold coin found during the practice, and the 
experimenter answered any questions. 
 
After completing the maze exploration task, participants received an $11 bonus for the 11 
gold coins found. Then, participants completed the Tridimensional Personality 
Questionnaire (TPQ) so that the participants in the 15-minute condition would have a 
brief intermission between encoding and test. The results of the TPQ have not been 
analysed.         
 
In the 15-minute condition, participants began the memory test after completing the TPQ 
(approximately 15-minutes after the completion of encoding); in the 24-hour condition, 
participants began the memory test 24-hours (± 2 hours) from the beginning of the maze 
exploration (incidental encoding) task.  
 
Phase 2 - Surprise recognition memory test: In the second phase, we surprised 
participants with a recognition memory test for the object pictures incidentally presented 
during the maze exploration task. We presented the participant with 288 objects one at a 
time, consisting of all 192 old objects displayed during the maze exploration task and 
only 96 new lure objects to shorten duration of the memory test. On each trial, the object 
appeared for 1.5 seconds. Then, “Old” and “New” appeared on the bottom of the screen, 
under the picture, to prompt the participant to indicate his or her memory response, using 
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the left and right arrow keys, respectively. After responding, we queried the participant’s 
confidence, as is standard practice for subsequent memory tasks. The scale “guess (1) 
pretty certain (2) very certain (3) completely certain (4)” appeared at the bottom of the 
screen, and the participant indicated the confidence of his or her memory judgment using 
the 1 to 4 keys (see Supplementary Methods for instructions). Participant responses in the 
recognition memory test were self-paced.  
 
Phase 3 - Surprise spatial location memory test: In the third phase, we administered a 
surprise spatial location memory test to see if participants’ memory for a given object’s 
encoded location was retroactively modulated by reward. We presented an old object in 
an otherwise blank maze, and the participants’ task was to move the object back to its 
encoded location. Participants were instructed that if they did not remember the exact 
square, they should move the object as close as possible to the encoded location to 
minimize the distance between the remembered location and actual encoded location (see 
Supplement for instructions).  
 
On each trial, an old object appeared in a randomly chosen maze square; the encoded 
location was never chosen as the initial square. Then the participant used the arrow keys 
to move the object through the maze until the object was in the remembered maze square, 
which the participant indicated by pressing the space bar. After making a choice, the 
participant indicated his or her confidence on the scale “guess (1) pretty certain (2) very 
certain (3) completely certain (4)”, which appeared at the bottom of the screen, using the 
1 to 4 keys. The spatial location memory test was self-paced.  
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For Experiment 1, participants completed 60 spatial location memory trials. We 
randomly selected 60 objects that were correctly identified as old objects during the 
Phase 2: recognition memory test. If a participant did not have enough hit trials (in 
Experiment 1, this applied to two participants in the 24-hour condition), the balance of 
trials was filled with miss trials, and these trials were removed from subsequent analyses.  
 
A subset of participants completed a reward memory test (results not reported). Then, 
each participant completed a written post-test questionnaire, which verified that the 
participant understood the task instructions and assessed their subjective experiences of 
the experiment, as well as a demographic form. Finally, participants were compensated 




We conducted Experiment 2 to test if both the reward proximity effect and reward 
proximity modulation by rest duration results from the 24-hour condition of Experiment 1 
replicated in a second sample. We repeated the exact same experiment in a second 
sample of participants. For Experiment 2, Phase 1 (maze exploration incidental encoding 
task) and Phase 2 (surprise recognition memory test) were identical to Experiment 1; 
Phase 3 (surprise spatial location memory test) was the same as Experiment 1, except that 
participants completed 90 spatial location memory trials, instead of 60.  
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In Experiment 2, participants had a low rate of repeated objects (2.42 ± 3.04% of all trials 
on average) or “Too Late” missed trials (4.61 ± 5.36% of all trials on average). 
 
Participants: For Experiment 2, we recruited 25 participants. We excluded two 
participants due to self-reported psychiatric diagnoses and/or psychoactive medication, 
one participant for not showing up to the second session (i.e. the memory test), and one 
participant for refusing to turn off his mobile phone during the maze encoding task, 
resulting in 21 participants (12 female; mean age (SD): 25.7 ± 5.1 years). Due to 
technical errors, only 20 participants completed the Phase 3: surprise spatial location 




In Experiments 1 and 2, the reward maze outcome (i.e. gold coin) was always presented 
in a maze square and the no reward outcome (i.e. maze over) was always presented above 
the maze. In these experiments we cannot disambiguate whether the reward proximity 
effect was caused by reward or by the location of the maze outcome, and consequently, 
we conducted Experiment 3 to test whether the reward proximity effect was due to 
reward modulation by comparing high vs. low rewards, always presented in the last 
square of the maze. In Experiment 3, participants had a low rate of repeated objects (2.34 




Participants: For Experiment 3, we recruited 42 participants. We excluded one 
participant due to technical error, six participants due to self-reported psychiatric 
diagnoses and/or psychoactive medication, one participant for not showing up to the 
second session (i.e. the memory tests), one participant for previously participating in a 
similar task, and one participant for misrepresenting his or her age (older than 35-years-
old), resulting in 32 participants (20 female; mean age (SD): 24.0 ± 4.7 years). Due to 
technical errors, only 28 participants completed the Phase 3 surprise spatial location 
memory test.  For Experiment 3, participants were compensated $12/hour for their time 
and $13.20 bonus ($1.10 for the practice and $12.10 for the maze exploration encoding 
task). 
 
Materials: For Experiment 3, the stimuli were identical to the stimuli used in Experiment 
1, except that participants were additionally presented with a small dime (heads side on a 
white background) to signify the end of a low reward maze. 
 
Procedure: To control for the effect of outcome location on the retroactive effect of 
reward effect, we conducted Experiment 3, which replicated the 24-hour condition of 
Experiment 1, except that we replaced the no reward maze over condition with a low 
reward condition. This way, the maze outcome – either a gold coin (still worth a bonus 
$1) or a dime (worth a bonus $0.10) – was always presented in a maze square. The 
instructions were the same, except that the instructions for the Phase 1 maze exploration 
(incidental encoding) task were modified: “In each maze, either a gold dollar coin or a 
dime is hidden. You will navigate through each maze to find the hidden coin. You will be 
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paid a $1 bonus for every gold coin that you find. You will be paid 10 cents for every 




We conducted Experiment 4 to test whether the reward proximity effect and the reward 
proximity by rest duration effect were supported by strategic rehearsal during the post 
encoding rest breaks. Experiment 4 was identical to the 24-hour condition of Experiment 
1 and to Experiment 2, except that during the maze encoding task, we replaced the rest 
breaks with one of three distractor tasks designed to interfere with strategic rehearsal at 
different levels of cognitive difficulty: a target detection task, a spatial navigation task, 
and a working memory task. In Experiment 4, participants had a low rate of repeated 
objects (2.25 ± 2.62% of all trials on average) or “Too Late” missed trials (4.70 ± 5.03% 
of all trials on average). 
 
Participants: For Experiment 4, we recruited 88 participants. We excluded five 
participants due to self-reported psychiatric diagnoses and/or psychoactive medication, 
four participants due to technical errors, and two participants for previously participating 
in a similar task, resulting in 77 participants (43 female, mean age (SD): 23.9 ± 5.0 
years). Of these, we assigned 27 participants to the target detection task, 27 participants 
to the spatial navigation condition, and 23 participants to the working memory condition. 
Due to technical errors, only 75 participants completed the Phase 3: surprise spatial 
location memory test. 
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Procedure: Experiment 4 was identical to the 24-hour condition of Experiment 1, except 
that during the 15, 20, or 25-second intervals following each maze, participants 
performed one of three distractor tasks with varying levels of cognitive load (described 
below) designed to prohibit strategic rehearsal during the breaks. In the practice session, 
participants practiced the distractor task following each of the two practice mazes. To 
help participants differentiate between the maze encoding task and the distractor task, at 
the onset of the distractor task, the screen’s background colour changed from the light 
grey used during the maze exploration to a darker grey.  
 
Target detection task: Participants were instructed to press the up arrow key each time a 
target (a black and white bulls eye image) appeared. Throughout the post-maze interval, a 
blank maze grid was presented. Intermittently, a stimulus – either the target (25% of 
trials) or a lure (a different coloured grey square, 75% of trials) – appeared in a randomly 
determined square within the maze. The stimulus was presented for 2 seconds, and the 
participant needed to respond to the target while the stimulus remained on the screen. If 
the participant did not respond within the allotted time or if an inaccurate response was 
made, a warning appeared at the top of the screen. A jittered interval (mean: 2.3 seconds) 
with a blank maze grid separated trials.  
 
Spatial navigation task: Participants were instructed that a target would appear in a blank 
maze and that they should use the up, down, left and right arrow keys to navigate to the 
target (again, a black and white bulls eye image). Throughout the post-maze interval, a 
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blank maze was presented, in which a target would appear in a randomly chosen square 
within the maze. The participants’ starting location was indicated with a white frame 
surrounding another randomly chosen square. Participants had 2 seconds to make a 
navigational choice. If participants did not make a choice within the response window, a 
warning appeared at the top of the screen. The next location square would turn white for 
.5-1.5 seconds (mean: 1.25 seconds). The next choice period was signalled by the square 
returning to the grey background colour. Participants navigated to a series of targets for 
the duration of the inter-maze interval.  
 
Working memory task: Participants were instructed that at the beginning of the post-maze 
interval, a target would appear and that they should press the up arrow any time an 
identical probe appeared during the series of probe stimuli that followed. The target was a 
blank maze with four randomly chosen squares appearing in colour (any combination of 
red, orange, yellow, green, blue, or purple, randomly chosen). Next, a series of probe 
stimuli appeared for 1.75 seconds: targets (20%), location lures (the same locations as the 
target, but different colours, 10%), colour lures (the same colours as the target, but 





We conducted all pre-processing in Matlab and analyses in R. Since our goal was to 
relate memory for a single item based on trial-by-trial variables such as reward and 
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proximity, the majority of the recognition memory analyses we report in the manuscript 
include only responses for old objects, as the lures were not associated with the necessary 
trial-by-trial variables. For the analyses of recognition memory (Phase 2), we used a 
multi-level logistic regression model to predict hits (i.e. an old object correctly identified 
as old) in R (glmer, in the lmer4 package).  
 
For the analyses of spatial location memory (Phase 3), we operationalized spatial 
memory by measuring the number of steps between the encoded location and the 
remembered location, and then, because the maximum possible error varied as a function 
of the object’s original encoding location (i.e. it is possible to have an error of 8 steps for 
an object encoded in the corner, but only four steps away from an object encoded in the 
centre of the maze), we scaled each error by the maximum possible error for that encoded 
location. Then we subtracted this score from 1 so that each trial was given a location 
memory score ranging from 0 (the remembered location was as far away as possible from 
the encoded location) to 1 (the encoded location was remembered correctly). 
Additionally, we also ran a parallel set of analyses that used the raw spatial location 
memory error. For the spatial location memory analyses, we only included trials for 
which the participant correctly identified the object as an old object (i.e. a hit) during the 
recognition memory test (Phase 2).  
 
We operationalized proximity as the number of sequential steps between the object and 
the outcome (reward or no reward), such that the object seen immediately before the 
maze end was one step away, the object before that was two steps away, and so forth up 
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to fifteen steps away. We operationalized spatial proximity as the number of maze steps, 
in any direction, between an object and the end square (minimum one step, maximum 
eight steps). Any object seen more than once during maze exploration due to a participant 
retracing his or her step was removed from all analyses.  
 
For the models, reward was effect-coded (1 for reward, -1 for no reward or low reward), 
proximity was mean-centred and scaled by subject, spatial proximity was mean-centred 
and scaled by subject, and rest duration was mean-centred and scaled by subject. In 
Experiment 1, the delay condition was effect coded (1 for 24-hour, -1 for 15-minute), and 
in Experiment 4, the distractor condition was coded as a factor. For the spatial location 
memory test, we additionally included Experiment, coded as a factor, as a predictor. 
 
In the main reward x proximity interactions, we fit separate intercept, reward, proximity, 
and reward x proximity interaction effects for each subject. For the models that included 
rest duration, we additionally added random effects for rest, the rest x reward interaction, 
the rest x proximity interaction, and the rest x reward x proximity interaction. We did not 
model correlations between the random effects across subjects. Models that did not 
converge were rerun using the bobyqa optimizer increased to 1,000,000 iterations.  
 
We estimated the confidence intervals using the confint.merMod function and the p-
values using the bootMer function (both from the lmer4 package) run with 2,500 
iterations. All p-values are two-tailed. To compare the model fits, we used likelihood 
ratio tests implemented with the anova function. 
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To ensure that our results were not due to modelling the data using a mixed effect model, 
we additionally fit a separate reward x proximity model to each participant’s data so that 
subject is treated as a fixed effect. We then used a linear regression model to fit the 




Supplementary Note 1 
 
Phase 2 – subsequent recognition memory, corrected hit rates 
 
To determine if participants’ memory performance is above chance, we calculated the 
corrected hit rate. For subsequent recognition memory tasks in which participants make 
old/new judgments about their memory for items, corrected hit rate (i.e. hits – false 
alarms) was used to determine if the participants’ memory was above chance, as this 
criterion measures participants’ ability to discriminate between old and new objects by 
taking into account participants’ response bias. Hit rate is defined as the rate at which old 
objects were correctly identified as old objects; false alarm rate was defined as the rate at 
which lure objects were incorrectly identified as old objects; and corrected hit rate was 
defined as hit rate minus false alarm rate. 
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In all conditions, the mean corrected hit rate was significantly above chance, indicating 
that participants’ recognition memory performance was above chance.  
 
Experiment 1: In the 24-hour condition (n = 23), the mean hit rate (SE) was 0.51 ± 0.03, 
the mean false alarm rate (SE) was 0.28 ± 0.04, and the mean corrected hit rate (SE) was 
0.23 ± 0.03 (one sample t-test; t(22)=7.97, p=0.000000062). In the 15-minute condition 
(n = 21), the mean hit rate (SE) was 0.59 ± 0.03, the mean false alarm rate (SE) was 0.26 
± 0.03, and the mean corrected hit rate (SE) was 0.34 ± 0.03 (one sample t-test; 
t(20)=11.44, p=0.00000000031).  
 
Experiment 2 (n = 21): We found a hit rate of 0.48 ± 0.03 and a false alarm rate of 0.30 ± 
0.03, resulting in a corrected hit rate of 0.18 ± 0.02 (one sample t-test; t(20)=8.86, 
p=0.000000023).  
 
Experiment 3 (n = 32): We found a hit rate of 0.53 ± 0.02 and a false alarm rate of 0.31 ± 
0.02, resulting in a corrected hit rate of 0.22 ± 0.02 (one sample t-test; t(31)=11.14, 
p=0.0000000000023). 
 
Experiment 4: In the target detection condition (n = 27), we found a hit rate of 0.49 ± 
0.02 and a false alarm rate of 0.31 ± 0.03, resulting in a corrected hit rate of 0.18 ± 0.02 
(one sample t-test; t(26)=10.09, p=0.000000000018). In the navigation condition (n = 
27), we found a hit rate of 0.50 ± 0.03 and a false alarm rate of 0.29 ± 0.02, resulting in a 
corrected hit rate of 0.21 ± 0.03 (one sample t-test; t(26)=7.42, p=0.000000071). In the 
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working memory condition (n = 23), we found a hit rate of 0.49 ± 0.03 and a false alarm 
rate of 0.32 ± 0.03, resulting in a corrected hit rate of 0.17 ± 0.02 (one sample t-test; 
t(22)=7.97, p=0.000000063).   
 
Phase 2 – reward by proximity effect, individual differences 
 
In each of the 24-hour condition recognition memory tests, we find that most participants 
show a negative reward x proximity effect when the participants’ data are analysed 
individually. In Experiment 1, 78.3% of participants have a negative slope. In Experiment 
2, 85.7% of participants have a negative slope. In Experiment 3, 81.3% of participants 
have a negative slope. In Experiment 4 – target condition, 96.3% of participants have a 
negative slope. In Experiment 4 – navigation condition, 88.9% of participants have a 
negative slope. In Experiment 4 – working memory condition, 73.9% of participants have 
a negative slope.  
 
Supplementary Note 2 
 
Additional potential explanations of the reward by proximity effect 
 
In the following sections, we examine potential modulators of memory that may affect 
the reward by proximity interaction. In the various analyses described below, we do not 




Phase 2 – subsequent recognition memory, effect of reward one step from maze outcome: 
 
When we test if reward modulates memory for the single object preceding a maze 
outcome, in most of the datasets, we find that the objects that immediately precede a 
reward outcome are remembered better than the objects that precede a no reward 
outcome (multi-level logistic regression; Experiment 1 – 24 hour condition: β=0.52, 
SE=0.20, z=2.55, CI95=[0.12, 0.91], p=0.013; Experiment 3: β=0.36, SE=0.16, z=2.27, 
CI95=[0.061, 0.67], p=0.015; Experiment 4 – target condition: β=0.50, SE=0.17, z=2.98, 
CI95=[0.17, 0.84], p=0.0072; navigation condition: β=0.44, SE=0.17, z=2.60, CI95=[0.11, 
0.77], p=0.010). We did not detect an effect of reward for memory on the first step in 
either Experiment 2, (multi-level logistic regression; β=0.12, SE=0.20, z=0.61 CI95=[-
0.27, 0.52], p=0.57) or Experiment 4 – working memory condition (multi-level logistic 
regression; β=0.26, SE=0.19, z=1.39, CI95=[-0.12, 0.62], p=0.16), although the effects are 
in same direction. 
 
Phase 2 – subsequent recognition memory, transformed proximity: 
 
One possibility is that the reward proximity effect is being driven entirely by modulated 
memory only for the objects closest to the reward. If this were the case, we would expect 
that a log transformed proximity measure would fit the data better. However, when we 
modelled the data including both mean-centred steps to end interacted with reward and 
logged steps to end interacted with reward, we found that the reward by proximity 
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interaction reported in the manuscript emerges (multi-level logistic regression; 
Experiments 1-4 combined: reward X proximity: β = -0.15, SE = 0.034, z = -4.53, p < 
0.0004), but we did not detect an interaction between the log transformed proximity and 
reward (multi-level logistic regression; all 24-hour datasets combined: reward X log 
proximity: β = 0.027, SE = 0.034, z = 0.81, p = 0.42). Consistent with the mean data 
reward by proximity plots (see Supplementary Figure 1e), this suggests that reward 
retroactively modulates memory for the preceding sequence of events, not just the object 
immediately preceding the maze outcome. 
 
Phase 2 – effect of spatial proximity and reward on recognition memory: 
 
Since, during maze navigation, each object is encoded in both a sequential and a spatial 
location, we were interested to see if rewards retroactively modulated memory for 
spatially proximal objects (here measured as number of maze steps in any direction to the 
maze end – minimum one step, maximum eight steps). In each dataset in which we tested 
memory after 24-hours, we found a reward by spatial proximity interaction such that 
rewards retroactively modulated memory for spatially proximal objects (or a trend in the 
same direction). However, one caveat to this analysis is that sequential proximity and 
spatial proximity are correlated. In models that include both the reward x sequential 
proximity interaction and the reward x spatial proximity interaction, we detected a reward 




Experiment 1: We found that reward and spatial proximity interact to predict memory 
(multi-level logistic regression; reward x spatial proximity: β=-0.086, SE=0.032, z=-2.67, 
CI95 = [-0.15, -0.022], p = 0.011). However, spatial proximity and sequential proximity 
were correlated (multi-level regression; spatial proximity ~ sequential proximity: β=0.78, 
SE=0.035, t=22.44, CI95 = [0.71, 0.85], p < 0.0004). When we controlled for the reward 
by sequential proximity interaction, we did not detect evidence that reward retroactively 
modulates memory by spatial proximity (multi-level logistic regression; reward x spatial 
proximity: β=-0.039, SE=0.038, z=-1.04, CI95 = [-0.11, 0.034], p = 0.30), but we still 
detected the reward proximity effect (multi-level logistic regression; reward x sequential 
proximity: β=-0.086, SE=0.028, z=-2.28, CI95 = [-0.16, -0.011], p = 0.024). 
 
Experiment 2: We found a trend such that reward and spatial proximity interact to predict 
memory (multi-level logistic regression; reward x spatial proximity: β=-0.067, SE=0.035, 
z=-1.92, CI95 = [-0.13, -0.00097], p = 0.044). However, spatial proximity and sequential 
proximity were correlated (multi-level regression; spatial proximity ~ sequential 
proximity: β=0.78, SE=0.029, t=26.87, CI95 = [0.72, 0.83], p < 0.0004). When we control 
for the reward by sequential proximity interaction, we did not detect evidence that reward 
retroactively modulates memory by spatial proximity (multi-level logistic regression; 
reward x spatial proximity: β=-.0030, SE=0.040, z=-0.076, CI95 = [-0.080, 0.077], p = 
0.94), but we still detected the reward proximity effect (multi-level logistic regression; 




Experiment 3: We found a trend such that reward and spatial proximity interact to predict 
memory (multi-level logistic regression; reward x spatial proximity: β=-0.038, SE=0.027, 
z=-1.41, CI95 = [-0.089, 0.014], p = 0.17). However, spatial proximity and sequential 
proximity were correlated (multi-level regression; spatial proximity ~ sequential 
proximity: β=0.79, SE=0.023, t=34.24, CI95 = [0.75, 0.84], p < 0.0004,). When we 
controlled for the reward by sequential proximity interaction, we did not detect evidence 
that reward retroactively modulates memory by spatial proximity (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward x spatial proximity: β = 0.038, SE = 0.032, z = 1.18, CI95 = [-0.024, 
0.10], p = 0.24), but we still detected the reward proximity effect (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward x sequential proximity: β=-0.14, SE=0.032, z=-4.43, CI95 = [-0.20, -
0.079], p < 0.0004).  
 
Experiment 4: We found that reward and spatial proximity interact to predict memory 
(multi-level logistic regression; reward x spatial proximity: target condition: β=-0.075, 
SE=0.029, z=-2.59, CI95 = [-0.19, -0.063], p = 0.011; navigation condition: β=-0.067, 
SE=0.030, z=-2.26, CI95 = [-0.13, -0.02], p = 0.011; working memory condition: β=-
0.056, SE=0.032, z=-1.76, CI95 = [-0.12, 0.0070], p = 0.082). However, spatial proximity 
and sequential proximity were correlated (multi-level regression; spatial proximity ~ 
sequential proximity: target condition: β=0.72, SE=0.035, t=20.65, CI95 = [0.65, 0.79], 
p<0.0004; navigation condition: β=0.74, SE=0.036, t=20.74, CI95 = [0.67 0.81], p < 
0.0004; working memory condition: β=0.80, SE=0.034, t=23.30, CI95 = [0.73, 0.87], p < 
0.0004). When we controlled for the reward by sequential proximity interaction, we did 
not detect evidence that reward retroactively modulates memory by spatial proximity 
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(multi-level logistic regression; reward x spatial proximity: target condition: β=-0.0094, 
SE=0.033, z=-0.28 CI95 = [-0.073, 0.055], p = 0.78; navigation condition: β=0.0079, 
SE=0.034, z=0.23, CI95 = [-0.057, 0.077], p = 0.84; working memory condition: β=0.015, 
SE=0.037, z=0.40, CI95 = [-0.058, 0.085], p = 0.66), but we still detected the reward 
proximity effect (multi-level logistic regression; reward x sequential proximity: target 
condition: β=-0.13, SE=0.033, z=-4.03, CI95 = [-0.20, -0.69], p < 0.0004; navigation 
condition: β=-0.15, SE=0.034, z=-4.44, CI95 = [-0.22, -0.085], p < 0.0004; working 
memory condition: β=- 0.13, SE=0.038, z=-3.44, CI95 = [-0.21, -0.056], p < 0.0004). 
 
Phase 2 – reward proximity effects on recognition memory cannot be explained by 
recency or primacy: 
 
The reward proximity effect on memory cannot be explained by simple primacy or 
recency effects (i.e. improved memory for the early or late items in a maze). 
 
Experiment 1: We tested for main effects of primacy (operationalized as steps from the 
start of the maze) and recency (operationalized as steps from the end of the maze, the 
proximity measure reported above). In the 24-hour condition, we did not find a main 
effect of either primacy (multi-level logistic regression; 24-hour condition: proximity to 
start: β=0.015, SE=0.0094, CI95=[-0.029, 0.0584, p=0.004) or recency (multi-level 
logistic regression; 24-hour condition: proximity to end: β=-0.16, SE=0.010, CI95=[-
0.046, 0.025], p=0.11) on memory. In the 15-minute condition, we found a main effect of 
primacy (multi-level logistic regression; 15-minute condition: proximity to start: β=-
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0.024, SE=0.010, CI95=[0.0048, -0.044], p=0.012) on memory but not a main effect of 
recency (multi-level logistic regression; 15-minute condition: proximity to end: β=-0.016, 
SE=0.010, CI95=[-0.035, 0.0035], p=0.12). 
 
Experiment 2: We did not detect a main effect of either primacy (multi-level logistic 
regression; proximity to start: β=0.0029, SE=0.012, CI95=[-0.020, 0.026], p=0.80) or 
recency (multi-level logistic regression; proximity to end: β=-0.0073, SE=0.010, CI95=[-
0.027, 0.012], p=0.48) on memory.  
 
Experiment 3: We did not detect a main effect of either primacy (multi-level logistic 
regression; proximity to start: β=0.0033, SE=0.027, CI95=[-0.048, 0.060], p=0.88) or 
recency (multi-level logistic regression; proximity to end: β=-0.038, SE=0.027, CI95=[-
0.090, 0.014], p=0.16) on memory. 
 
Experiment 4: We did not detect a main effect of either primacy or recency in any 
condition (multi-level logistic regression; target detection condition: proximity to start: 
β=-0.0013, SE=0.0085, CI95=[-0.018, 0.016], p=0.83; target detection condition: 
proximity to end: β=-0.0026, SE=0.0093, CI95=[-0.021, 0.016], p=0.79; navigation 
condition: proximity to start: β=0.0029, SE=0.012, CI95=[-0.020, 0.026], p=0.80); 
proximity to end: β=0.0088, SE=0.0087, CI95=[-0.0083, 0.026], p=0.30; working memory 
condition: proximity to start: β=-0.011, SE=0.0098, CI95=[-0.049, 0.095], p=0.49); 
proximity to end: β=0.0057, SE=0.0095, CI95=[-0.071, 0.078], p=0.97).  
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Phase 2 – no effect of maze length on reward proximity effect on recognition memory 
 
One possible explanation for the reward proximity effect is that the length of the mazes is 
driving the effect; however, we did not detect evidence of this in our data.  
 
Experiment 1: In the 24-hour condition, we did not find that the reward proximity effect 
interacts with maze length (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity x maze 
length: β=-0.017, SE=0.061, CI95=[-0.11, 0.14], p=0.81), nor did we find that the reward 
x proximity x rest duration interaction interacts with maze length (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward x proximity x rest duration x maze length: β=-0.048, SE=0.061, 
CI95=[-0.31, 0.16], p=0.58).  
 
Experiment 2: We did not find that the reward proximity effect interacts with maze length 
(multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity x maze length: β=-0.039, SE=0.034, 
CI95=[-0.11, 0.03], p=0.26), nor did we find that the reward x proximity x rest duration 
interacts with maze length (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity x rest 
duration x maze length: β=-0.059, SE=0.063, CI95=[-0.19, 0.07], p=0.37). 
 
Experiment 3: We did not find that the reward proximity effect interacted with maze 
length (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity x maze length: β=-0.010, 
SE=0.027, p=0.71); however, only in Experiment 3, we found a trend such that the 
reward x proximity x rest duration interacted with maze length (multi-level logistic 
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regression; reward x proximity x rest duration x maze length: β=-0.098, SE=0.053, 
p=0.06). 
 
Experiment 4: In the target detection condition, we did not find that the reward proximity 
effect interacts with maze length (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity x 
maze length: β=-0.0060, SE=0.030, CI95=[-0.065, 0.052], p=0.81), nor did we find that 
the reward x proximity x rest duration interacts with maze length (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward x proximity x rest duration x maze length: β=-0.024, SE=0.056, 
CI95=[-0.14 0.08], p=0.67). In the navigation condition, we did not find that the reward 
proximity effect interacts with maze length (multi-level logistic regression; reward x 
proximity x maze length: β=-0.0057, SE=0.030, CI95=[-0.065, 0.052], p=0.81), nor did 
we find that the reward x proximity x rest duration interacts with maze length (multi-level 
logistic regression; reward x proximity x rest duration x maze length: β=-0.083, 
SE=0.059, CI95=[-0.21, 0.030], p=0.15). In the working memory condition, we did not 
find that the reward proximity effect interacts with maze length (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward x proximity x maze length: β=-0.045, SE=0.033, CI95=[-0.11, 0.018], 
p=0.17), nor did we find that the reward x proximity x rest duration interacts with maze 
length (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity x rest duration x maze length: 
β=-0.10, SE=0.074, CI95=[-0.06, 0.24], p=0.22). 
 
Phase 2 – the reward proximity effect is not better explained by time elapsed between 
encoding and maze outcome 
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Although the jitter was pseudo-randomized across the reward and no reward mazes, one 
possibility is that the reward proximity effect was confounded by the time elapsed 
between an object presentation and the maze outcome. When we tested for an interaction 
of reward and time in seconds from the onset of the end outcome (“time to end”) on 
recognition memory (i.e. replacing proximity with the time elapsed until the outcome), 
we found results that paralleled the reward proximity reported in the main manuscript 
(multi-level logistic regression; reward x time to end: Experiment 1 – 24-hour condition: 
β = -0.11, SE = 0.038, z = -3.12, CI95 = [-0.19, -0.043], p = 0.0018; Experiment 2: β = -
0.14, SE = 0.033, z = -4.21, CI95 = [-.21, -0.075], p < 0.0004; Experiment 3: β = -0.20, SE 
= 0.061, z = -3.31, CI95 = [-0.32, -0.081], p < 0.0004; Experiment 4 – target detection: β = 
-0.16, SE = 0.029, z = -5.79, CI95=[-0.23, -0.11], p < 0.0004; navigation: β = -0.17, SE = 
0.029, z = -5.73, CI95=[-0.23, -.011], p < 0.0004; working memory: β = -0.15, SE = 
0.032, z = -4.62, CI95=[-0.21, -0.083], p < 0.0004). 
 
Phase 2 – the reward proximity effect is not confounded by whether the object was 
presented on the inside or the outside of the maze  
 
Another possibility is that differences in navigational behaviour between the reward and 
no reward mazes may confound the reward proximity effect. However, participants do 
not know if a given maze will end in reward or no (low) reward during navigation, and 
thus, there cannot be systematic difference in navigational behaviour between the two 
reward conditions.  
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Another possibility is that different locations within the maze may be more salient. For 
example, the inside of the maze may have been more salient, and this salience may have 
biased memory and confounded the reward proximity effect. Here we operationalized 
inside as the nine squares on the inside of the maze and outside as the 16 squares on the 
perimeter. We did not find that objects’ inside/outside location modulated memory 
(multi-level logistic regression; inside/outside, coded inside = 1, outside = -1: Experiment 
1 – 24-hour condition: β = 0.016, SE = 0.033, z = 0.47, CI95 = [-0.052, 0.081], p = 0.64; 
Experiment 2: β = 0.043, SE = 0.037, z = 1.16, CI95=[-0.029, 0.12], p = 0.25; Experiment 
3: β = -0.023, SE = 0.032, z = -0.71, CI95 = [-0.085, 0.040], p = 0.48 Experiment 4 – 
target condition: β = 0.043, SE = 0.030, z = 1.43, CI95 = [-0.015, 0.10], p = 0.17; 
navigation condition: β = -0.0060, SE = 0.030, z = -0.20, CI95 = [-0.064, 0.055], p = 
0.84), although in the working memory condition of Experiment 4, we found a trend such 
that participants were more likely to remember objects from the inside of the maze 
(multi-level logistic regression; working memory condition: β = 0.060, SE = 0.033, z = 
1.84, CI95=[-0.00084, 0.13], p = 0.050).  
 
Next, we tested if the reward proximity effect remained even when we accounted for the 
inside/outside location of encoding. We found that the reward proximity effect persisted 
in every experiment (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity: Experiment 1 – 
24-hour condition: β = -0.11, SE = 0.035, z = -3.05 CI95 = [-0.17, -0.037], p = 0.004; 
Experiment 2: β = -0.13, SE = 0.033, z = -3.78 CI95 = [-0.19, -0.061], p < 0.0004; 
Experiment 3: β = -0.12, SE = 0.027, z = -4.46, CI95 = [-0.17, -0.070], p < 0.0004; 
Experiment 4 – target condition: β = -0.14, SE = 0.029, z = -4.79 CI95 = [-0.20, -0.084, p 
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< 0.0004; navigation condition: β = -0.15, SE = 0.029, z = -5.03, CI95 = [-0.20, -0.088], p 
< 0.0004; working memory condition: β = -0.12, SE = 0.032, z = -3.95, CI95 = [-0.19, -
0.061], p < 0.0004). In these models, we did not detect a main effect of inside/outside in 
any experiment (multi-level logistic regression; inside/outside: Experiment 1 – 24-hour 
condition: β = 0.011, SE = 0.034, z = 0.33, CI95 = [-0.058, 0.075], p = 0.74; Experiment 
2: β = 0.046, SE = 0.038, z = 1.21, CI95 = [-0.028, 0.12], p = 0.23; Experiment 3: β = -
0.022, SE = 0.032, z = -0.70, CI95 = [-0.085, 0.041], p = 0.48; Experiment 4 – target 
condition: β = 0.043, SE = 0.029, z = 1.47, CI95 = [-0.014, 0.10], p = 0.14; navigation 
condition: β = -0.0034, SE = 0.030, z = -0.11, CI95 = [-0.061, 0.056], p = 0.92), although 
again we found a trend such that participants were more likely to remember objects from 
the inside of the maze (multi-level logistic regression; Experiment 4 – working memory 
condition: β = 0.058, SE = 0.033, z = 1.77, CI95 = [-0.0056, 0.12], p = 0.073). Together, 
these results suggest that the reward proximity effect is not confounded by the 
inside/outside encoding location of the object.  
 
Phase 2 – effect of object history by location on recognition memory 
 
We analysed whether the total number of objects encoded in a given location (object 
history by location) modulated memory in that location. In Experiments 2, 3 and 4, we 
found that the probability of remembering any given object decreased as the number of 
total objects encoded in that location increased (multi-level logistic regression; object 
history by location – minimum = 1 object, maximum = 22 objects, mean = 5.53 objects: 
Experiment 2: β = -0.035, SE = 0.0095, z = -3.69, CI95 = [-0.055, -0.16], p < 0.0004; 
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Experiment 3: β = -0.037, SE = 0.0056, z = -6.63, CI95 = [-0.048, -0.026], p < 0.004; 
Experiment 4 – target condition: β = -0.037, SE = 0.0093, z = -3.99, CI95 = [-0.056, -
0.019], p < 0.0004; navigation condition: β = -0.025, SE = 0.0086, z = -2.95, CI95 = [-
0.042, -0.0087], p = 0.0032; working memory condition: β = -0.052, SE = 0.011, z = -
4.63, CI95 = [-0.074, -0.031], p < 0.0005). Additionally, in Experiment 1 – 24-hour 
condition, we found a trend in the same direction (multi-level logistic regression; object 
history by location: Experiment 1: β = -0.018, SE = 0.010, z = -1.76, CI95 = [-0.037, 
0.0017], p = 0.066).  
  
To answer this question, we tested whether previous objects in location affected memory, 
and whether this effect was different than an overall effect of time in the full task. In 
Experiments 2, 3 and 4, we found that as the number of objects previously experienced in 
any maze location increases, the memory for that object decreased (multi-level logistic 
regression; object history by location: Experiment 2: β = -0.035, SE = 0.0095, z = -3.69, 
CI95 = [-0.055, -0.16], p < 0.0004; Experiment 3: β = -0.037, SE = 0.0056, z = -6.63, CI95 
= [-0.048, -0.026], p < 0.004; Experiment 4 – target condition: β = -0.037, SE = 0.0093, z 
= -3.99, CI95 = [-0.056, -0.019], p < 0.0004; navigation condition: β = -0.025, SE = 
0.0086, z = -2.95, CI95 = [-0.042, -0.0087], p = 0.0032; working memory condition: β = -
0.052, SE = 0.011, z = -4.63, CI95 = [-0.074, -0.031], p < 0.0005). Additionally, in 
Experiment 1 – 24-hour condition, we found a trend in the same direction (multi-level 
logistic regression; object history by location: Experiment 1: β = -0.018, SE = 0.010, z = -
1.76, CI95 = [-0.037, 0.0017], p = 0.066).  
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However, object history by location was confounded with number of trials encoded, and 
we found strong correlations between object history by location and encoding trial in 
each dataset (multi-level regression; Experiment 1 – 24-hour condition: β = 0.049, SE = 
0.0011, t = 43.56, CI95 = [0.046, 0.051], p < 0.0004; Experiment 2: β = 0.049, SE = 
0.0011, t = 45.97, CI95 = [0.047, 0.051], p < 0.0004; Experiment 3: β = 0.049, SE = 
0.00090, t = 54.29, CI95 = [0.047, 0.051], p < 0.0004; Experiment 4 – target: β = 0.047, 
SE = 0.00090, t = 52.07, CI95 = [0.045, 0.049], p < 0.0004; navigation: β = 2.81, SE = 
0.076, t = 37.22, CI95=[0.048, 0.053], p < 0.0004; working memory: β = 0.050, SE = 
0.0013, t = 37.94, CI95=[0.047, 0.052], p < 0.0004).  Therefore, we suspected that the 
main effect of objects history by location was actually an effect of trials encoded. To test 
this, we ran models in which both object history by location and encoding trial predicted 
memory and found that in each model, encoding trial was a significant predictor of 
memory, such that as encoding trial increased, the likelihood of remembering an object 
decreased (multi-level logistic regression; encoding trial: Experiment 1 – 24-hour 
condition: β = -0.0026, SE = 0.0011, z = -2.46, CI95 = [-0.0046, -0.00060], p = 0.0088; 
Experiment 2: β = -0.0030, SE = 0.00098, z = -3.14, CI95 = [-0.0050, -0.0012], p = 
0.0008; Experiment 3: β = -0.0030, SE = 0.00091, z = -3.33, CI95 = [-0.0048, -0.0013], p 
= 0.0008; Experiment 4 – target: β = -0.0037, SE = 0.00086, z = -4.27, CI95 = [-0.0053, -
0.0020], p < 0.0004; working memory: β = -0.0031, SE = 0.0010, z = -3.00, CI95 = [-
0.0051, -0.00098], p = 0.004). We did not detect a significant effect of encoding trial in 
Experiment 4 – navigation condition (multi-level logistic regression; encoding trial: β = -
0.00079, SE = 0.00090, z = -0.88, CI95=[-0.0025, 0.00099], p = 0.38). When we 
considered the effect of object history, we did not detect any significant effects in these 
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models (multi-level logistic regression; object history: Experiment 1 – 24-hour condition: 
β = 0.015, SE = 0.016, z = 0.98, CI95 = [-0.016, 0.046], p = 0.34; Experiment 2: β = 
0.0039, SE = 0.016, z = 0.25, CI95 = [-0.027, 0.036], p = 0.85; Experiment 3: β = -0.0044, 
SE = 0.014, z = -3.039, CI95 = [-0.034, 0.024], p = 0.75; Experiment 4 – target: β = 0.012, 
SE = 0.014, z = 0.83 CI95 = [-0.017, 0.039], p = 0.42; navigation: β = -0.016, SE = 0.013, 
z = -1.23, CI95 = [-0.042, 0.010], p = 0.21; working memory: β = -0.012 SE = 0.015, z = -
0.77, CI95 = [-0.042, 0.017], p = 0.44).  
 
Phase 2 – effect of reward history by location on recognition memory 
 
Additionally, it is possible that the previous reward history of a given location may 
modulate memory.  In Experiment 1 and the target condition of Experiment 4, we did not 
find that reward history by location, defined as the number of rewards previously 
experienced in a given object’s location, modulated object memory (reward history by 
location – minimum = 0 rewards, maximum = 4 rewards, mean = 0.26 rewards). In 
Experiment 1 and two conditions of Experiment 4, we did not find that reward history by 
location (i.e. for each object the number of rewards previously experienced in that 
location) modulates object memory (multi-level logistic regression; reward history by 
location: Experiment 1: β = 0.033, SE = 0.061, z = 0.55, CI95 = [-0.091, 0.15, p = 0.61; 
Experiment 4 – target: β = -0.037, SE = 0.064, z = -0.59, CI95 = [-0.16, 0.087], p = 0.58; 
working memory: β = 0.022, SE = 0.057, z = 0.39, CI95=[-0.086, 0.14], p = 0.68). In 
Experiments 2, 3 and one condition of Experiment 4, we found a trend such that 
participants were less likely to remember an object, if more rewards had been previously 
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experienced in that location (multi-level logistic regression; Experiment 2: β = -0.12, SE 
= 0.064, z = -1.94, CI95 = [-0.25, 0.0090], p = 0.062; Experiment 3: β = -0.14, SE = 0.072, 
z = -1.92, CI95 = -0.28, 0.0046], p = 0.058; navigation: β = -0.098, SE 0.060, z = -1.63, 
CI95 = [-0.21, 0.021], p = 0.11). In the working memory condition of Experiment 4, we 
found the opposite pattern: participants were more likely to remember an object if more 
rewards had been previously experienced in that location (multi-level logistic regression; 
working memory condition: β=0.022, SE=0.057, z=0.39, p=0.070). This inconsistent 
pattern of results suggests that previous reward history by location does not reliably 
modulate subsequent memory. 
 
Next, we tested if the reward proximity effect remained when we accounted for the 
previous reward history by location and found that the reward proximity effect persisted 
in every experiment (multi-level logistic regression; reward x proximity: Experiment 1 – 
24-hour: β = -0.11, SE = 0.035, z = -3.09, CI95 = [-0.18, -0.043], p = 0.0024; Experiment 
2: β = -0.12, SE = 0.037, z = -3.32, CI95 = [-0.20, -0.049], p < 0.0004; Experiment 3: β = -
0.12, SE = 0.028, z = -4.22, CI95 = [-0.17, -0.062], p < 0.0004; Experiment 4 – target: β =  
-0.14, SE = 0.029, z = -4.79, CI95 = [-0.20, -0.084], p < 0.0004; navigation condition: β = 
-0.15, SE = 0.029, z = -4.98 CI95 = [-0.21, -0.092], p < 0.0004; working memory 
condition: β = -0.13, SE = 0.035, z = -3.66, CI95 = [-0.19, -0.063], p = 0.0008). In these 
models, we did not detect a main effect of reward history by location (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward history by location: Experiment 1 – 24-hour: β = 0.039, SE = 0.061, z 
= 0.63, CI95 = [-0.088, 0.16], p = 0.51; Experiment 2: β = -0.11, SE = 0.064, z = -1.79, 
CI95 = [-0.25, 0.012], p = 0.066; Experiment 4 – target: β = -0.031, SE = 0.065, z = -0.49, 
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CI95 = [-0.16, -0.098], p = 0.61; navigation: β = -0.084, SE = 0.060, z = -1.39, CI95 = [-
0.21, 0.033], p = 0.16; working memory: β = 0.028, SE = 0.057, z = 0.49, CI95 = [-0.085, 
0.14], p = 0.64), except in Experiment 3, in which we detected a negative trend, such that 
as reward history by location increased, memory decreased (multi-level logistic 
regression; reward history by location: β = -0.13, SE = 0.073, z = -1.76, CI95 = [-0.27, 
0.007], p = 0.078).  
 
Together these analyses suggest that previous reward history does not confound the 
reward proximity effect.  
 
Supplementary Note 3 
 
Phase 3 – spatial memory measured in steps also retroactively modulated by reward and 
proximity 
 
The reward proximity effect on spatial memory was not simply a by-product of the 
chance-corrected memory scoring: we found the same pattern of results when we conduct 
the same analysis using the uncorrected error score (i.e. the number of steps error 
between the encoded location and the remembered location; lower error indicates better 
memory; multi-level regression; Experiments 1-4 combined; 24-hour conditions: reward 
x proximity: β=0.037, SE=0.014, t=2.57, CI95 = [0.0094, 0.066], p = 0.0056; reward: β=-




Supplementary Figure 1. Hit rates by condition. (a) In Experiment 1 (24-hour condition: 
n = 23; 15-minute condition: n = 21), we found a trend towards a reward by delay 
condition interaction (multi-level logistic regression; β=-0.083, SE=0.059, CI95=[-0.092, 
0.007], p=0.081), such that we detected a significant main effect of reward in the 15-
minute condition (multi-level logistic regression; β=-0.082, SE=0.037, CI95=[0.011, 
0.15], p=0.023), but not the 24-hour condition (multi-level logistic regression; β=-0.0037, 
SE=0.034, CI95=[-0.071, 0.062], p=0.92). (b) In Experiment 2 (n = 21), we did not detect 
a main effect of reward (multi-level logistic regression; β=-0.037, SE=0.033, CI95=[-0.10, 
0.029], p=0.25). (c) In Experiment 3 (n = 32), we did not detect a main effect of reward 
(β=-0.038, SE=0.028, CI95=[-0.089, 0.019], p=0.18). (d) In Experiment 4 (target 
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interaction between distractor condition and reward (multi-level logistic regression; target 
detection condition vs. navigation condition: β=-0.014, SE=0.041, CI95=[-0.064, 0.096], 
p=0.73; target detection vs. working memory condition: β=-0.037, SE=0.042, CI95=[-
0.12, 0.045], p=0.38). Nor did we detect a main effect of reward in any of the conditions 
(multi-level logistic regression; target detection condition: β=0.013, SE=0.029, CI95=[-
0.042, 0.070], p=0.63; navigation condition: β=0.027, SE=0.029, CI95=[-0.029, 0.086], 
p=0.35; target detection condition vs. navigation condition: β=-0.024, SE=0.032, CI95=[-
0.088, 0.038], p=0.44). (e) Mean hit rates by proximity, reward vs. no/low reward. 
Examining the unmodeled data, we still find a “crossover” pattern, showing an 
interaction between reward and proximity (multi-level logistic regression; all 24-hour 
data sets combined: main effect of reward for objects 1, 2, or 3 steps from maze outcome: 
β=0.26, SE=0.041, z=6.29, p<0.0004; 4, 5, or 6 steps: β=0.0036, SE=0.043, z=-0.084, 
p=0.93; 7, 8, or 9 steps: β=-0.30, SE=0.052, z=-5.78, p<0.0004; 10, 11, or 12 steps: β=-
0.36, SE=0.082, z=-4.33, p<0.0004; 13, 14, or 15 steps: β=-0.45, SE=0.14, z=-3.12, 





Supplementary Figure 2. Effect of reward on memory at the individual level. (Experiment 
1). We additionally predicted memory as a function of reward and proximity on 
participants’ data individually. Here, we plot a histogram of the reward x proximity effect 
for the (a) 24-hour condition (n = 23) and (b) 15-minute condition (n = 21). We find that 
the reward x proximity effect in the 24-hour condition is significantly lower than the 
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p=0.014). Post-hoc tests showed that the reward x proximity effect was significantly 
lower than 0 in the 24-hour condition (one-sample t-test; µ=-0.067, SE=0.022, z=-3.03, 
p=0.74), but not the 15-minute condition (one-sample t-test; µ=0.01, SE=0.025, z=0.64, 
p=0.0012). Additionally, we plot the subject-level models for each participant for both 




Supplementary Figure 3. Replications of the reward proximity effect. (Experiments 2 and 
3) (a) Experiment 2. Reward proximity effect (n = 21). Replicating the 24-hour condition 
in Experiment 1, rewards retroactively modulated memory, such that participants were 
more likely to remember objects that were more proximal to the reward. (b) Experiment 
3. Reward proximity effect (n = 32). In this version the outcome is always presented 
within the maze (either $1 or a dime). The results replicate the reward proximity effect. 
(c) Experiment 2. Effect of rest duration. Replicating the 24-hour condition in 
Experiment 1, we found that the duration of the rest break following each maze 
modulated the reward proximity effect, such that the interaction was stronger if the rest 
break following the maze was longer. Again, we find that the model including rest 
duration explains the data significantly better than the simpler model. (d) Experiment 3. 
Effect of rest duration. Even when the outcome is always presented within the maze 
(either $1 or a dime), we found that the duration of the rest break following each maze 
modulated the reward proximity effect, such that the interaction was stronger if the rest 
break following the maze was longer. The inset depicts the beta coefficients for the 
reward and no reward conditions; error bars represent the standard error of the reward x 
proximity interaction.    
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Supplementary Figure 4. Reward proximity effect increases with longer rest intervals. 
(Replication: Experiment 4). (a) In the target detection condition (n = 27), we found that 
the duration of the rest break following each maze modulated the reward proximity 
effect, such that the interaction was stronger if the rest break following the maze was 
longer (multi-level logistic regression; target detection condition: reward x proximity x 
rest duration: β=-0.19, SE=0.045, CI95=[-0.29, -0.11], p<0.0004). (b) In the navigation 
condition (n = 27), we found that the duration of the rest break following each maze 
modulated the reward proximity effect, such that the interaction was stronger if the rest 
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break following the maze was longer (multi-level logistic regression; β=-0.13, SE=0.039, 
CI95=[-0.21, -0.057], p=0.0016). (c) In the working memory condition (n = 23), we found 
that the duration of the rest break following each maze modulated the reward proximity 
effect, such that the interaction was stronger if the rest break following the maze was 
longer (multi-level logistic regression; working memory condition: reward x proximity x 
rest duration: β=-0.17, SE=0.041, CI95=[-0.25, -0.090], p<0.0004). The direct comparison 
of the three conditions did not reveal a significant difference between the groups (multi-
level logistic regression; target detection condition vs. navigation condition x reward x 
proximity x rest duration: β=-0.061, SE=0.055, CI95=[-0.048, 0.17], p=0.25; target 
detection condition vs. working memory condition x reward x proximity x rest duration: 
β=0.028, SE=0.057, CI95=[-0.087, 0.15], p=0.63) (see Supplementary Table 3b for post-
hoc tests). The insets depict the beta coefficients for the reward and no reward conditions; 













β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
a.	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Delay	Condition -0.061 0.024 -0.11 -0.013 0.012
24-hour	Condition:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.011 0.035 -0.18 -0.036 0.004
Reward:	Proximity -0.16 0.049 -0.25 -0.065 <	0.0004
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.054 0.045 -0.32 0.14 0.21
15-minute	Condition:	Reward	x	Prox 0.014 0.034 -0.051 0.079 0.68
Reward:	Proximity -0.039 0.048 -0.13 0.058 0.41
No	Reward:	Proximity -0.067 0.054 -0.17 0.033 0.19
β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
b.	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration	x	Delay	Condition -0.067 0.031 -0.13 -0.0054 0.033
24-hour	Condition:	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration -0.12 0.042 -0.20 -0.036 0.0048
15s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.12 0.15 -0.44 0.17 0.44
Reward:	Proximity -0.56 0.30 -1.24 0.027 0.061
No	Reward:	Proximity -0.25 0.079 -0.41 -0.099 0.0008
20s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.20 0.045 -0.29 -0.11 <	0.0004
Reward:	Proximity -0.11 0.053 -0.21 -0.0062 0.038
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.29 0.074 0.16 0.46 <	0.0004
25s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.22 0.066 -0.36 -0.095 0.0008
Reward:	Proximity -0.26 0.093 -0.46 -0.073 0.008
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.19 0.094 -0.0077 0.39 0.051
15-minute	Condition:	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration 0.18 0.05 -0.081 0.12 0.74
15s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.31 0.16 -0.65 -0.0024 0.054
Reward:	Proximity -1.11 0.36 -2.04 -0.46 0.0008
No	Reward:	Proximity -0.24 0.092 -0.43 -0.069 0.0048
20s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.063 0.055 -0.17 0.045 0.24
Reward:	Proximity -0.044 0.056 -0.16 0.064 0.432
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.087 0.087 -0.084 0.26 0.31
25s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity 0.039 0.071 -0.10 0.19 0.58
Reward:	Proximity 0.026 0.12 -0.20 0.25 0.80





β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
a.	Reward	x	Proximity	 -0.12 0.033 -0.19 -0.059 0.0008
Reward:	Proximity -0.15 0.048 -0.25 -0.05 0.0008
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.098 0.052 -0.0053 0.20 0.066
β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
b.	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration -0.14 0.044 -0.23 -0.062 0.0016
15s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.23 0.16 -0.56 0.057 0.12
Reward:	Proximity -0.53 0.3 -1.16 0.056 0.072
No	Reward:	Proximity -0.087 0.078 -0.24 0.066 0.27
20s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.15 0.046 -0.24 -0.054 0.0032
Reward:	Proximity -0.084 0.056 -0.19 0.022 0.12
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.21 0.074 0.07 0.35 0.004
25s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.3 0.076 -0.46 -0.15 <	0.0004
Reward:	Proximity -0.37 0.098 -0.58 -0.18 <	0.0004
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.23 0.10 0.036 0.44 0.019
β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
c.	Reward	x	Proximity	 -0.12 0.027 -0.17 -0.071 <	0.0004
Gold	Coin:	Proximity -0.16 0.038 -0.24 -0.085 <	0.0004
Dime:	Proximity 0.083 0.038 0.0084 0.16 0.029
β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
d.	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration -0.18 0.035 -0.25 -0.11 <	0.0004
15s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.19 0.12 -0.45 0.047 0.12
Gold	Coin:	Proximity -0.68 0.29 -1.33 -0.12 0.02
Dime:	Proximity -0.26 0.067 -0.4 -0.12 0.0008
20s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.2 0.038 -0.28 -13 <	0.0004
Gold	Coin:	Proximity -0.071 0.044 -0.16 0.014 0.11
Dime:	Proximity 0.34 0.066 0.22 0.48 <	0.0004
25s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.31 0.057 -0.43 -0.2 <	0.0004













β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
a Reward	x	Proximity	x	Distractor	Condition	(Target	Detection	vs.	Navigation) -0.0086 0.041 -0.084 0.074 0.89
Reward	x	Proximity	x	Distractor	Condition	(Target	Detection	vs.Working	Memory) 0.013 0.043 -0.065 0.098 0.68
Target	Detection:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.14 0.029 -1.95 -0.083 <	0.0004
Reward:	Proximity -0.15 0.041 -0.23 -0.069 0.0008
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.13 0.041 0.050 0.21 <	0.0004
Navigation	Condition:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.15 0.029 -0.21 -0.089 <	0.0004
Reward:	Proximity -0.18 0.042 -0.27 -0.098 <	0.0004
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.11 0.041 0.35 0.19 0.0064
Working	Memory	Condition:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.13 0.032 -0.19 -0.064 <	0.0004
Reward:	Proximity -0.11 0.045 -0.19 -0.018 0.022
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.15 0.045 0.056 0.24 0.0008
β SE CI95Lower CI95Upper p-value
b Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration	x	Distractor	Condition	(Target	Detection	vs.	Navigation) 0.061 0.055 -0.048 0.18 0.25
Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration	x	Distractor	Condition	(Navigation	vs.	Working	Memory) 0.028 0.057 -0.087 0.15 0.63
Target	Detection:	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration -0.19 0.045 -0.29 -0.11 <	0.0004
Naviagation:	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration -0.13 0.039 -0.21 -0.057 0.0016
Working	Memory:	Reward	x	Proximity	x	Rest	Duration -0.17 0.042 -0.25 -0.09 <	0.0004
All	Distractor	Conditions	combined:
15s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.022 0.078 -0.19 0.13 0.75
Reward:	Proximity -0.18 0.15 -0.49 0.12 0.41
No	Reward:	Proximity -0.14 0.041 -0.22 -0.056 0.0008
20s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.21 0.024 -0.25 -0.16 <	0.0004
Reward:	Proximity -0.0062 0.17 -0.36 0.31 <	0.0004
No	Reward:	Proximity 0.31 0.19 -0.062 0.67 <	0.0004
25s	Rest	Duration:	Reward	x	Proximity -0.30 0.036 -0.37 -0.23 <	0.0004
Reward:	Proximity -0.32 0.19 -0.42 -0.21 <	0.0004






















For memory to be adaptive, the brain must prioritize memory for events that are 
motivationally relevant. The neurotransmitter dopamine signals motivationally relevant 
information and may facilitate the selection of memories to be consolidated for future 
use. Indeed, research from animal and cellular models has shown that dopamine in the 
hippocampus improves memory, particularly after a delay. Yet questions remain about 
how dopamine modulates memory in healthy humans, the mechanisms by which it does 
so, and when these effects emerge. To address these questions, we used a double-blind 
design to administer d-amphetamine (a dopamine agonist) to healthy human participants 
and test its effect on encoding, consolidation, and retrieval of associative memories. 
Participants received either drug (n=40) or placebo (n=20) before they encoded novel 
associations between pairs of objects. Memory was tested either immediately (on drug or 
placebo) or a week later (no drug). Associative memory performance was measured as 
participants’ ability to correctly discriminate between intact and rearranged object pairs. 
Participants also performed a working memory task to detect whether effects of d-
amphetamine on working memory and attention might mediate any effects on later 
memory. We found that both immediate and delayed associative memory was enhanced 
by dopamine. But whereas immediate associative memory performance was mediated by 
the effects of dopamine on working memory, delayed memory performance was 
predicted by drug levels at encoding. These findings suggest that dopamine promotes 
hippocampus-dependent long-term memory through multiple mechanisms: it indirectly 
supports memories that in the short term by enhancing working memory and attention, 
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and directly supports the formation of memories that last for days, as predicted by 






The ability to encode relationships between components of an event is crucial to episodic 
memory, providing scaffolding for the rich, detailed memories. It is well known that 
encoding these associations depends on the hippocampus (Burgess et al., 2002; Tulving 
& Markowitsch, 1998). Both theoretical and physiological studies have suggested that 
neuromodulators – and dopamine in particular – play a critical role in prioritizing the 
long term survival of hippocampus-dependent associative memories for motivationally 
relevant events (Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 2011; Rogerson, Cai, Frank, 
Sano, Shobe, Lopez-Aranda, & Silva, 2014a; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). Yet, empirical 
evidence for the role of dopamine in episodic memory in humans has been lacking, due to 
the methodological challenges of manipulating dopamine levels in healthy adults. In 
particular, questions remain about how dopamine enhances associative memory in 
humans, the mechanisms by which it does so, and time course over which these effects 
emerge. 
 
Animal studies have identified a potential mechanism underlying the prioritization of 
associative memories. Since the neurotransmitter dopamine signals motivationally 
relevant information, such as unexpected rewards (Glimcher, 2011; Schultz et al., 1997, 
see also Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Gershman & Schoenbaum, 2017), dopaminergic 
reward signals may be well poised to facilitate the selection of adaptively important 
memories to be consolidated for future use(Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). Indeed, in 
hippocampal slice preparations, dopamine facilitates late phase long-term potentiation, 
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with effects that are not immediately detectable but instead emerge only after a delay of 
hours (U. Frey, Schroeder, & Matthies, 1990; Lemon & Manahan-Vaughan, 2006; S. Li 
et al., 2003; Rossato, Bevilaqua, Izquierdo, Medina, & Cammarota, 2009b). These results 
converge with experiments that pharmacologically or optogenetically modulate dopamine 
in rodents, which find that dopamine enhances memory-based behavior when memory is 
tested after a delay (typically the next day) (Bethus et al., 2010; McNamara et al., 2014). 
Together, these findings suggest that dopamine modulates memory at both the synaptic 
and behavioral levels. Moreover, these findings emphasize that dopamine enhances the 
long-term survival of memories, which is thought to reflect the role of dopamine in 
consolidation-dependent plasticity.  
 
In humans, there is some indirect evidence for similar mechanisms from studies that use 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure the effects of reward 
motivation on memory and brain activity (Adcock et al., 2006; Wittmann et al., 2007; 
2005). Although fMRI measures blood flow, rather than neuromodulatory processes per 
se, fMRI studies have shown that episodic memory encoding of motivationally relevant 
events involves correlated BOLD activity in the hippocampus and in the midbrain, a 
region known to contain dopaminergic neurons (Adcock et al., 2006).  
 
More direct evidence in humans comes from pharmacological experiments that 
manipulate levels of dopamine agonists and test the effects on memory. Some such 
experiments have shown that dopamine agonists enhance memory for neutral events and 
that these effects emerge after long delays (Ilieva, Boland, & Farah, 2013). But these 
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results have been inconsistent, and somewhat surprisingly, a few studies additionally 
show that dopamine agonists enhance memory immediately or after relatively short 
delays as well, see (Ilieva et al., 2013) for a review.  
 
This inconsistency may be related to the wide variation of memory tasks that were used 
across studies. For example, these studies have shown effects of dopamine agonists on 
list learning and working memory, but have not specifically tested the effects of 
dopamine agonists on associative memory. Altogether then, these previous experiments 
have lacked behavioral specificity regarding the effect of dopamine modulation on 
different forms of memory, measuring forms of memory that do not necessarily depend 
on the hippocampus.  
 
An additional challenge in assessing the specificity of the cognitive effects of 
pharmacological manipulations in humans is the mode of drug administration. Rather 
than directly injecting the drug into the hippocampus as is done in animal models, in 
humans, drugs are administered systemically. Consequently, in addition to modulating 
long-term memory mechanisms, drug administration has broad effects, including 
enhancing working memory and attention (Broadway, Frank, & Cavanagh, 2018). 
Therefore previous experiments could not determine whether drug-induced changes in 
memory were due to hippocampal modulation or due to a broader effect of the drug on 
working memory and other executive processes. Since memory formation depends on 
how the experience is encoded, changes in working memory, attention, and other 
executive functions caused by dopamine agonists may indirectly modulate memory.  
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Here, we addressed open questions about the effect of neuromodulation on associative 
memory in humans. We pharmacologically manipulated dopamine levels with the 
dopamine agonist d-amphetamine, using a double blind, placebo-controlled experimental 
design. Then, we tested memory on an associative memory task known to rely on the 
hippocampus. We opted to focus on the effect of d-amphetamine on memory for 
associations between neutral stimuli, so that we could isolate the neuromodulatory effects 
on memory. Additionally, since d-amphetamine improves aspects of executive function, 
throughout encoding we measured participants’ executive functioning with a multi-
faceted working memory test that required flexible cognitive control and attentional 
filtering (McNab & Klingberg, 2008). This additional testing allowed us to differentiate 
between the direct effects of d-amphetamine on associative memory, and any indirect 
effects that are mediated by its effects on working memory.  
 
Given the established effects of dopamine agonists on working memory and attention, 
and the enhancing effects of attention on memory (Aly & Turk-Browne, 2017), we 
predicted that d-amphetamine could enhance long-lasting memories in two ways – either 
by improving elaborative encoding and working memory processes in the short term or 
by facilitating consolidation of associative memory processes in the long term. 
Specifically, we expected that when memory was tested the same day as encoding, the 
effects of d-amphetamine on memory would be mediated through its effect on working 
memory. However, since the effects of dopamine-mediated, late-phase long term 
potentiation (LTP) emerge only after consolidation, we predicted that when we tested 
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memory at a delay, we would find a direct effect of the dopamine agonist that was not 
explained by changes in working memory.  
 
Participants were orally administered either d-amphetamine tablets (n = 40) or placebo (n 
= 20). While on drug or placebo, they memorized a series of trial-unique object pairs 
(Figure 1a); participants were shown pairs of object images and asked to imagine a vivid 
scenario that involved both objects directly interacting. At test, a series of object pairs 
was presented, and participants were instructed to indicate if the object pairs were intact 
(two objects studied together in that combination), rearranged (two objects studied in 
different combinations), or new (at least one new object). To examine how d-
amphetamine differentially modulated memory at both short and long delays, for each 
participant, we tested memory for half of the encoded pairs immediately following the 
working memory distractor task and for the other half, after a week delay (Figure 1b). 
Associative memory was then measured as participants’ ability to discriminate between 
the intact and the rearranged object pairs.  
 
In between encoding and the same day memory test, participants performed a brief 
“distractor task” that tested their executive functioning, which quantified working 
memory performance concurrent with encoding. For the working memory task (Figure 
1c), participants were rapidly presented with a stream of 4 to 7 letters in either red or red 
and blue. After a short delay a target letter was presented, and participants needed to 
indicate if it had been presented in the list. There were two conditions: a “red game” in 
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which participants were instructed to attend only to red letters and a “both game” in 
which participants attended to both red and blue letters. 
 
Figure 1. The experiment consisted of an associative memory task and a working memory 
task performed while on drug or placebo. (a) Associative memory task. Participants were 
instructed to deliberately encode pairs of object stimuli (presented for 3s) with a vivid 
scenario that involved both objects directly interacting, and then rate the vividness of the 
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association they generated (1.5 s for the decision) (top). At test, participants were 
presented with pairs of objects for 3s each, and their task was to indicate if the object 
pairs were intact (two old objects studied in that combination), rearranged (two old 
objects that were not studied together) or new (at least one new object) (bottom). (b) 
Experimental Timeline. On Week 1, using a double-blind design, participants were 
administered either d-amphetamine (n = 40) or placebo (n = 20). The behavioral data 
collection began approximately 110 minutes after drug administration. Participants 
completed two rounds of the encoding-distractor-test blocks on each encoding day. To 
compare the effects of d-amphetamine after consolidation, memory was tested on half of 
the objects on the same day and half after a week delay. On Week 2, participants returned 
to be tested on the remaining object pairs. (c) For the Working Memory Task (“distractor 
task”), there were two conditions, a “red game” (signaled with red Xs) in which the 
participant should only pay attention to red letters, and a “both game” (signaled with 
purple Xs), in which the participant should pay attention to both red and blue letters. 
After the task instructions (colored Xs), participants saw a stream of 4 or 7 letters (each 
presented for .5 s) in either red or red and blue. After a 2 s delay, participants were 
presented with a target and indicated if the target letter was amongst the attended letters 




We first tested the effect of d-amphetamine level (mg d-amphetamine/kg body weight) on 
associative memory performance, both when memory was tested on the same day and 
after a week delay. We found that as d-amphetamine levels increased, memory 
performance increased (drug level: β = 0.19; SE = 0.093, t = 2.081; see Figure 2a). There 
was no interaction with delay (drug level x delay: β = 0.0090, SE = 0.58, t = 0.16).  
 
We additionally found that as d-amphetamine levels increased, working memory 
performance also increased (β = 0.36, SE = 0.12, t = 2.90, p = 0.0053, see Figure 2b). We 
therefore tested whether improved working memory may influence how d-amphetamine 
modulates associative memory. We found that working memory at encoding was also a 
significant predictor of associative memory performance in the same day condition (β = 
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0.46, SE = 0.12, t = 3.68, p = 0.00052), and we found a trend in the same direction in the 
week delay condition (β = 0.15, SE = 0.076, t = 1.97, p = 0.054, see Figure 2c), with 
working memory having a significantly greater effect in the same day condition (β = -
0.15, SE = 0.055, t = -2.84).  
 
To determine whether the influence of d-amphetamine on associative memory was due to 
a direct effect on episodic memory or an indirect effect via its influence on working 
memory, we conducted a mediation analysis for both the same day and week delay 
conditions. When memory was tested the same day, the effect of d-amphetamine on 
associative memory was fully mediated by d-amphetamine’s effect on working memory. 
When memory was tested after a week, however, the drug directly and independently 
enhanced associative memory accuracy (same day condition – indirect effect of working 
memory: β = 0.16, CI95 = [0.034, 0.35)], p = 0.006; week delay condition – direct effect 
of drug: β = 0.20, CI95 = [0.031, 0.37)], p = 0.014: see Figure 2d). The results of the 
mediation analysis suggest that there are two different mechanisms by which dopamine 
enhances memory: for memory tested after a week delay, dopamine directly enhances 
associative memory; for memory tested after a short delay, performance is enhanced 




Figure 2. D-amphetamine enhances associative memory through differential pathways 
when tested same day versus after a delay. (a) As d-amphetamine levels increased, 
memory performance increased (drug level: β = 0.19; SE = 0.093, t = 2.081). Considering 
the delay conditions separately, this effect was observed in the week delay (drug level: β 
= 0.20, SE = 0.074, t = 2.74, p = 0.0081) but not in the short delay condition (drug level: 
β = 0.19; SE = 0.14, t = 1.35, p = 0.18). However, there was no drug level x delay 
interaction: β = 0.0090, SE = 0.58, t = 0.16. (b) As d-amphetamine levels increased, 
working memory performance increased (drug level: β = 0.36, SE = 0.12, t = 2.90, p = 
0.0053). (c) Working memory at encoding predicted associative memory performance in 
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the same day condition (working memory: β = 0.46, SE = 0.12, t = 3.68, p = 0.00052), 
with a trend in the same direction in the week delay condition (working memory: β = 
0.15, SE = 0.076, t = 1.97, p = 0.054). Working memory had a significantly greater effect 
in the same day condition (working memory X delay: β = -0.15, SE = 0.055, t = -2.84). 
(d) When memory is tested same day, the effect of d-amphetamine on associative 
memory is mediated by working memory; however, when memory is tested after a delay, 
we find a direct effect of d-amphetamine on associative memory. 
 
 
Finally, we sought to determine whether these results were specific to associative 
memory or whether they hold for non-associative item memories, which are not thought 
to require the hippocampus. To examine this, we focused on participants’ memory for the 
items that were presented, but whose association was not remembered correctly. In 
contrast to the pattern found in the associative memory condition, d-amphetamine did not 
directly influence non-associative memory either the same day or after a week delay 
(drug – same day: β = 0.14, SE = 0.088, t = 1.57, p = 0.12; week delay: β = -0.0034, SE = 
0.092, t = -0.037, p = 0.97; drug X delay: β = -0.071, SE = 0.57, t = -1.24). Additionally, 
we did not detect an effect of working memory on non-associative memory in the 
immediate condition (working memory – same day: β = 0.11, SE = 0.11, t = 0.98, p = 
0.33), but we found that working memory enhanced non-associative memory in the week 
delay condition (week delay: β = 0.21, SE = 0.088, t = 2.37, p = 0.021; working memory 
X delay: β = 0.060, SE = 0.057, t = 1.05). Instead, when memory was tested the same 
day, drug level did not reliably relate to memory accuracy (indirect effect of working 





Figure 3. D-amphetamine does not have a direct effect on non-associative memory tested 
either same day or after a week delay. (a) In contrast to associative memory, d-
amphetamine did not directly influence non-associative memory at either delay (drug – 
same day: β = 0.14, SE = 0.088, t = 1.57, p = 0.12; week delay: β = -0.0034, SE = 0.092, t 
= -0.037, p = 0.97; drug X delay: β = -0.071, SE = 0.57, t = -1.24). (b) Additionally, we 
did not detect an effect of working memory in the immediate condition (working memory 
– same day: β = 0.11, SE = 0.11, t = 0.98, p = 0.33), but at a week delay, we found that as 
working memory increased, non-associative memory increased (working memory: β = 
0.21, SE = 0.088, t = 2.37, p = 0.021; working memory X delay: β = 0.060, SE = 0.057, t 
= 1.05). (c) When we test if and how the effect of d-amphetamine on non-associative 
memory is mediated by working memory, we do not detect a direct effect of d-
amphetamine on non-associative memory performance. Instead we only find a direct 








We tested differential mechanisms by which d-amphetamine at encoding affects long-
lasting memory. Previous research examining the effect of dopamine on memory had not 
specifically tested how d-amphetamine modulates hippocampus dependent memory nor 
had it accounted for the broader effects of the drug on cognition. In this experiment, we 
addressed these issues by administering d-amphetamine and using behavioral tests to 
measure associative memory, which is known to be hippocampus-dependent, while 
concurrently measuring working memory performance. These results provide 
experimental evidence that dopamine enhances hippocampus dependent associative 
memory through two distinct mechanisms: when tested after a short delay, memory is 
indirectly mediated by working memory performance; however, when memory is tested 
after a long delay, it is directly modulated by d-amphetamine levels. Critically, these 
findings were selective for hippocampus dependent associative memory, and were not 
observed for item memories that can be supported by cortical regions outside of the 
hippocampus.   
 
We pharmacologically simulated the neurochemical states evoked by motivationally 
salient experiences and tested the effects on memory for motivationally neutral stimuli to 
demonstrate that these neurotransmitters are sufficient to enhance memory. In the 
process, we identified two constituent pathways by which these neurotransmitters 
enhance memory, which manifest differentially when memory is tested at different 
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delays. This suggests that, prior to consolidation, motivational states influence our 
memory for events by altering how we process and encode those events.  
 
In addition to enhancing memory through synaptic potentiation, dopamine also modulates 
memory consolidation through other mechanisms that facilitate the enhancement of 
memory for motivationally relevant information. Specifically, recent research suggests 
that dopamine and rewards may selectively increase post-encoding hippocampal replay 
both shortly after encoding (Ambrose et al., 2016; Singer & Frank, 2009) and also during 
sleep (McNamara et al., 2014). This suggests that dopamine may work on multiple levels 
– via long term potentiation at the cellular level and hippocampal replay at the systems 
level – that work in concert to facilitate the selective enhancement of memory for 
motivationally relevant events.  
 
Both dopamine and norepinephrine signal motivationally relevant information 
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; España, Schmeichel, & Berridge, 2016) and are often co-
released. For this experiment we wanted to pharmacologically mimic a high motivation 
state, and therefore, we chose to modulate these neurotransmitters using d-amphetamine, 
which is an agonist for both dopamine and norepinephrine (Rothman et al., 2001). Our 
results are consistent with predictions from cellular preparations and dopaminergic 
manipulations in rodents, but because norepinephrine also modulates memory (Y.-Y. 
Huang & Kandel, 1996; Roozendaal & Hermans, 2017; Tully & Bolshakov, 2010), our 
experiment cannot discriminate between the distinct contributions of each 
neurotransmitter. Our results are generally consistent with these findings and future 
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experiments will be necessarily to explore the unique contributions of dopamine and 
norepinephrine.  
 
This research provides insight into the role of catecholamine neurotransmitters in 
enhancing human memory, with implications for how the brain adaptively prioritizes 
memory for motivationally relevant information. We characterize distinct pathways for 
the effect of d-amphetamine on memory at different delays, and show that these effects 
are selective for hippocampally-dependent associative memories. Moreover, we resolve 
uncertainties in the field about whether dopamine modulates memory similarly across 
species. These results are consistent with predictions generated from cellular long-term 
potentiation and with pharmacological research demonstrating that dopamine at encoding 
selectively enhance memory, and thus provide an important link between these literatures 




For this experiment, we directly tested the effects of a dopamine and norepinephrine 
agonist, d-amphetamine, on associative memory performance when memory was tested 
both on the same day and after a week delay.  
 
Participants: We recruited participants from the Columbia University and Columbia 
University Medical Campuses, with a protocol approved by the New York State 
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Psychiatric Institute Institutional Review Board and Columbia University Morningside 
Campus Institutional Review Board.  
 
Before drug administration, participants were extensively screened for any 
contraindications that may make them more susceptible to adverse drug effects or 
otherwise ineligible for the experiment. Before enrolling participants into the experiment, 
we used a phone interview to pre-screen them. To participate in Week 0 (screening 
session), participants needed to be 18- to 35-years-old, fluent in English, and if female, 
not pregnant or lactating; additionally, participants needed to have normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, no history of head trauma, learning disorders, psychiatric diagnoses, 
cardiovascular or liver diseases; no current use of amphetamines, opiates, cocaine or 
other psychoactive drugs (other than nicotine), and must have had experience with other 
stimulants (such as caffeine) without any adverse effects. Participants were eligible to 
participate in Week 1 (encoding and same-day test session) and Week 2 (delay test 
session) if they had negative urine toxicology, no detected psychopathology (including 
alcohol and drug dependence), no current or positive history of severe neurological 
illness or brain abnormality, no severe medical illness, no liver disease, no insulin-
dependent diabetes, no cardiovascular disease, no hypertension, no more than one risk 
factor for coronary artery disease, and no family history of sudden death, bipolar 
disorder, or schizophrenia.  
 
We recruited 81 participants; the study physician obtained informed consent. 21 
participants did not continue beyond Week 0: Participants were excluded for psychiatric 
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history or diagnoses (11 participants), cardiovascular diagnoses (2 participants), a family 
history of schizophrenia (2 participants), administrative or technical issues (2 
participants), positive toxicology (1 participant), severe medical illness (1 participant), 
non-compliance (refusing to perform the experimental task, 1 participant), and one 
participant elected to withdraw from the experiment. A total of 60 participants 
participated in Weeks 1 and 2 (43 female; age: 24.75 ± 4.41; see Supplementary Table 1). 
 
At the end of each session, participants were compensated for their time: $50 for the 
screening session, $25/hour for the drug or placebo administration session (4-6 hours 
total), and $50 for the final behavioral session. 
 
Materials: During Session 2, participants were administered dextroamphetamine sulfate 
(d-amphetamine; 5 mg tablets; maximum dosage: 20 mg; Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals) 
or placebo orally. Then, the study physician administered a high dose of d-amphetamine 
(n = 20, 0.3 mg/kg body weight), a low dose of d-amphetamine (n = 20; 0.15 mg/kg body 
weight) with a maximum dose of 20 mg or placebo (n = 20) to the participants. Since 
participants’ body weight varied considerably and the dosing options were fixed in 5 mg 
intervals, there is substantial variability in dosing level; therefore, we used drug level (mg 




Participants completed up to three sessions of the experiment, each one week apart.  
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Week 0 (screening): During the first session, the study physician obtained participants’ 
written consent, and then participants completed a medical and psychological screening, 
neuropsychological testing, and an experimental task.  
 
Medical and Psychological Screening: During the screening session, participants 
received a medical exam and provided a self-report of their medical history. To test for 
contraindications, participants received an EKG and provided blood and urine samples. 
Female participants were additionally screened for pregnancy. Participants then 
completed neuropsychological testing consisting of the Wechsler Memory Scale Verbal 
Paired Associates (I & II), forward and reverse digit span, and operation span. We did not 
detect any significant differences between the drug and placebo groups on any of these 
measures. Additionally, an experimenter administered a structured diagnostic interview 
(Diagnostic Interview for Genetic Studies) to screen for psychiatric history.   
 
After the screening procedures, participants performed two blocks (encoding-distractor-
test) of the Associative Memory Task (see below); these results will be reported 
separately.  
 
The morning following the Week 0 session, participants were contacted so that they 




Eligible participants were then invited to participate in Weeks 1 and 2.  
 
Week 1 (d-amphetamine or placebo administration – encoding and same day memory 
test):  
 
First, since the first pregnancy tests might not have detected the very early stages of 
pregnancy, female participants were re-screened for pregnancy at the beginning of the 
Week 1 appointment. Next, all participants had baseline blood pressure and heart rate 
measures taken. Then, the study physician administered either d-amphetamine or 
placebo; both the study researcher and the participant were blind to the drug condition.  
 
To monitor for any adverse effects, we measured participants’ heart rate and blood 
pressure every five minutes for the first 30 minutes and every 15 minutes thereafter for at 
least four hours (and up to six hours) following drug or placebo administration. 
Additionally, participants completed the abbreviated Amphetamine Interview Rating 
Scale every 30 minutes to continually monitor for adverse side effects induced by the 
drug.  
 
90 minutes after d-amphetamine or placebo administration, participants completed 
another experimental cognitive task that will be reported separately. They also completed 
the delay condition of the Week 0 Associative Memory Task, and two blocks (encoding-
distractor-test) of the Associative Memory Task.  
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Participants were monitored for the remainder of the four- to six-hour supervisory period. 
At the end of Week 1, participants completed a drug questionnaire, which queried 
participants’ subjective experiences related to the drug or placebo and their beliefs about 
their performance on the experimental tasks. Before leaving, a physician completed a 
brief exit physical exam.  
 
The morning following the Week 1 session, participants were again contacted to report 
how many hours they had slept the previous night (see Supplementary Table 1).  
 
Week 2 (off drug – delay test):  
 
First, participants completed another experimental cognitive task (these results will be 
reported separately). Then, we conducted the delay condition of the Associative Memory 
Task, testing the remaining objects pairs studied in Week 1. Additionally, we 
administered a recognition memory test for the objects. Finally, participants completed 
post-test questionnaires to query their subjective experiences for the experimental tasks, 
as well as the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (Cloninger, 1987) and the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (“The SPQ: a scale for the assessment of 
schizotypal personality based on DSM-III-R criteria.,” 1991). The results of these 





Associative Memory Task: 
 
First, participants were trained on all phases of the associative memory task: encoding, 
distractor, and test. During this training, participants were instructed that they would 
study pairs of objects and that their memory for those object pairs would be tested both 
on the same day and after a week delay.  
 
Encoding: During each encoding block, we presented participants with a series of trial-
unique objects pairs on a white background (3 s), one pair at a time. For each object pair, 
participants were instructed to imagine a novel scenario that involved both objects; we 
encouraged participants to imagine vivid scenarios that involved both objects directly 
interacting to form a direct association between the objects. Then, participants were cued 
to rate the vividness of the novel scenario they had generated when object pairs were 
replaced with a screen that read “Vivid: 1 2 3 4”. Participants had 1.5 s to indicate with 
the number keys how vivid their imagined scenario was. This rating was done on a scale 
that went from 1 (“not very vivid”) to 4 (“very vivid”). The vividness rating chosen 
turned red for the duration of the rating interval to indicate that the response had been 
received. Each encoding trial was separated by a fixation cross (duration: 0.5 – 3.0 s, 
mean(sd) = 1.32 s ± 0.78). In each of the two encoding blocks, participants encoded and 
rated the vividness of 76 object pairs, for a total of 152 objects.   
 
Memory Test: To compare the effects of drug when memory is tested after a short versus 
long delay, we tested participants’ memory for half of the object pairs immediately 
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following the distractor task and memory for the other half of the object pairs a week 
later. Participants were instructed that for the memory task, they would be tested on how 
well they could remember whether objects had been paired together. We presented 
participants with pairs of objects that were intact (two objects studied together), 
rearranged (two objects that were studied in different combinations), or new (participants 
were instructed that new object pairs contained at least one new object; in actuality, we 
always presented two new objects). Participants had 3 s to indicate the type of 
combination – intact, rearranged, or new – each test pair corresponded to. The same day 
and week delay memory tests each consisted of 68 trials (20 intact trials, 28 rearranged 
trials and 20 new trials), for a total of 136 memory trials. Each encoding trial was 
separated by a fixation cross (duration: 0.5 – 3.0 s, mean ± sd = 1.32 s ± 0.78).  
 
Distractor Task (Working Memory Task):  
 
To simultaneously insert a brief delay (approximately 3 min) between the encoding and 
the same day memory tests and collect a measure of working memory during encoding, 
participants completed a short working memory test between each encoding and same 
day test blocks. This working memory test was a non-spatial adaption of (McNab & 
Klingberg, 2007), which is a type of task dopamine agonists have been shown to enhance 
performance on (Broadway et al., 2018).  
 
At the beginning of each encoding session, participants completed 30 practice trials of the 
working memory test (which we described to them as a “distractor task”) to become 
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accustomed to the task’s rapid pace. Then, for each of the two encoding blocks per day, 
participants completed 24 trials of the working memory test between each encoding block 
and each same day test block, for a total of 48 trials. For all analyses, we have combined 
the test performance of these two test blocks into a single working memory score.   
 
Participants were instructed that they would perform a “distractor task” that consisted of 
two games: the “red” game and the “both” game. In both games, the participant saw a 
sequence of letters for 0.5 s and then, following a 2 s delay, a target letter presented in 
black. The participant then had 1.5s to use the number keys to indicate whether the target 
letter was presented in the previous list, with the cues “Yes” or “No”. The participant’s 
response turned the selection (either “Yes” or “No”) red for the duration of the choice 
period to indicate that the response had been recorded. Half of the targets presented were 
old letters, meaning they had been previously presented, while the other half were lure 
targets.  
 
Each sequence was either four or seven letters long and consisted either only of red 
letters or of both red and blue letters. The only difference between the tasks was which 
letters the participants needed to pay attention to: In the red game, participants were 
instructed to pay attention only to the red letters, but in the both game, participants were 
instructed to pay attention to both the red and the blue letters. To indicate which game 
participants should play, a cue – XXXX in either red for the red game or purple for the 





Associative Memory Task: To measure participants’ ability to discriminate between the 
intact and rearranged pairs, we calculated d’: (z(hit rate) – z(false alarm rate)), in which a 
hit was a correctly identified intact pair and a false alarm was a rearranged pair that was 
incorrectly called intact. Non-associative memory performance (also referred to as “item 
only” memory performance) was also measured with d’, but where a hit was correct 
identification of old objects with an incorrect judgment of their association (i.e. referring 
to an intact pair as rearranged or a rearranged pair as intact; in either case, pairs of items 
were recognized as old but the association was not remembered). False alarms were new 
trials that were incorrectly called either intact or rearranged.  
 
Distractor Task: To measure participants’ working memory performance, we calculated 
d’ for the hits (correctly identifying the target as being an attended letter in the list) and 
the false alarms (incorrectly identifying a lure target as being an attended letter in the 
list).  
 
For the models that included delay, the immediate condition was effect coded (-1 for the 
same day condition; 1 for the week delay condition). Both drug level and working 
memory performance were mean centered and scaled.  
 
The data were preprocessed in Matlab and analyses were conducted in the R 
programming language. We ran the analyses as regressions, with random effects when 
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appropriate. We included all of the potential random effects, except for when the model 






















Multiple learning systems allow people to learn about their environments using different 
information. The striatal system facilitates learning stimuli-responses associations based 
on outcomes, while the hippocampal system facilitates encoding associations between 
features of the environment. The neurotransmitter dopamine modulates behavior for both 
of these systems: for stimulus-response learning, dopamine provides a learning signal 
used to update choice behavior and for hippocampus dependent associative memory, 
dopamine has been shown to enhance memory formation. However, since we often use 
the information that we learn to guide choices in the future, an important open question is 
how dopamine differentially modulates performance after consolidation for each learning 
system. Additionally, we wanted to know if dopamine at encoding increased the 
integration of memories. Using two different learning paradigms in which overlapping 
associations were learned using trial-by-trial feedback (Experiment 1) or using deliberate 
memorization without feedback (Experiment 2), we tested how pharmacologically 
manipulating dopamine during learning modulates the survival of learning supported by 
each learning system when memory is tested after a delay. We found that with both 
learning from feedback and learning without feedback, dopamine at encoding enhances 
later memory of the associations. Additionally, we tested whether dopamine at encoding 
modulated subsequent integration of the overlapping associations, but we did not detect 





The ability to integrate discrete events is adaptive. To encode the different facets of our 
experience, the human brain has multiple learning systems that specialize in learning 
distinct aspects of the environment (Gordon, 1988). The striatum supports learning 
associations between stimuli and responses based on outcomes (Foerde & Shohamy, 
2011; J. Li & Daw, 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2003; 2004), while the hippocampus supports 
encoding of the associations between stimuli (Davachi, 2006a; Dusek & Eichenbaum, 
1997; Staresina & Davachi, 2009). The neurotransmitter dopamine modulates both of 
these learning systems: it provides a learning signal used to update choice behavior for 
stimulus-response learning (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Rutledge et 
al., 2010; Schultz et al., 1997); and potentiates hippocampal long-term memories 
(Fonseca, Nägerl, Morris, & Bonhoeffer, 2004; Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 
2011). Since we often use the information that we learn after a delay, which allows time 
for consolidation, we wanted to test how pharmacologically manipulating dopamine 
during learning differentially modulates the survival of different types of information 
after a delay.  
 
For stimulus response learning, it is well established from both animal electrophysiology 
research and human fMRI experiments that dopamine provides a learning signal that 
indicates differences between the expected and received outcomes (Schultz et al., 1997). 
Therefore, we would expect that pharmacologically manipulating dopamine levels during 
learning would modulate the ability to learn from outcomes. Yet, research in humans into 
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the effects of manipulating dopamine during learning are mixed, sometimes improving 
learning, sometimes having no detectable effect, and sometimes only causing a detectable 
effect when the environment changes dramatically, such as during reversal learning 
(Fonseca et al., 2004; M. J. Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004; Grogan et al., 2017; 
Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; 2014; Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 2011; 
Shohamy & Adcock, 2010; Shohamy, Myers, Geghman, Sage, & Gluck, 2006). Most of 
these studies have used patients with Parkinson’s disease as a model of dopaminergic 
dysfunction, and tested the effect of replenishing dopamine with medication. Thus, some 
of the inconsistencies may be related to differences in stages of disease, in medication 
dose, or other factors that could not be controlled. Moreover, physiological work suggests 
that the effects of dopamine emerge only after time for consolidation.  
 
In contrast to the striatum, the hippocampus supports learning associations between 
stimuli. These stimulus-stimulus associations have been shown to be enhanced by 
dopamine when memory is tested after a delay (Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 
2011; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). The hippocampus is also known to support the 
integration of separate but related associations into a network of relational memories 
(Schlichting, Zeithamova, & Preston, 2014; Shohamy & Daw, 2015; Shohamy & 
Wagner, 2008). Such integration is essential for forming flexible memories that can be 
used to support novel inferences (Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Wimmer & Shohamy, 
2012). In particular, associative memories with shared features may result in separate 
events being represented in memory in an integrated manner (Duncan & Schlichting, 
2018). As such, the representations for the related features may be shared by both 
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memory representations, potentially forming indirect relational links between these 
distinct events. Previous research has demonstrated memory integration in humans 
(Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012; Zeithamova & Preston, 2010). 
Evidence from fMRI and patients with impaired hippocampal function suggests that the 
hippocampus plays a crucial role in both encoding distinct events and integrating across 
memory (Myers et al., 2006; Shohamy & Wagner, 2008). Interestingly, research suggests 
that the neurotransmitter dopamine may facilitate memory integration. According to this 
model, when encoding an event that is similar to a previous experience, integration 
occurs when the memory for the previously experienced event is partially reinstated and 
the new experience utilizes the shared aspects of the reinstated representation when it is 
encoded (Duncan & Schlichting, 2018). Since dopamine facilitates the long-term 
potentiation of memory over a relatively broad temporal window and facilitates the long-
term potentiation of relatively weak memory traces (i.e. as would predicted by a partially 
reactivated memory), it is hypothesized that dopamine at encoding will bias the 
hippocampus towards encoding overlapping memories in an integrated, rather than 
distinct, representation.  
 
Findings from fMRI supports this hypothesis, showing greater integration is correlated 
with activity in midbrain regions with dopaminergic projections. However, 
pharmacological evidence testing the effect of dopamine after consolidation on striatal 
dependent stimulus-response learning and hippocampus dependent memory integration in 
healthy humans is lacking. Therefore, with this experiment, we tested 1. Does d-
amphetamine increase hippocampus-dependent memory integration? And 2. Does d-
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amphetamine’s effect on memory integration vary depending on how the information is 
encoded? To address the role of dopamine in learning associations, remembering them, 
and integrating them, we tested whether a dopamine agonist, d-amphetamine, modulates 
both learning and memory integration in humans, using a double blind, placebo-
controlled experimental design. Participants completed two different experiments that 




To test how dopamine modulates memory integration, participants learned about 
overlapping associations between stimuli on two separate experimental paradigms, while 
on either drug or placebo. Participants completed these two different tasks that measure 
choice behavior based on integrated memories – the acquired equivalence task 
(Experiment 1) in which learning the associations depends on the striatum and the paired 
associates task with overlapping objects (Experiment 2) in which learning the 
associations depends on the hippocampus (see Figure 1). These data were collected in 
parallel with the data described in Chapter 2. For additionally methodical detail regarding 





Figure 1. Experiment protocol overview. On week 1, participants were administered 
either drug (n = 40) or placebo (n = 20), and then we waited for 90 minutes to give the 
drug time to reach its pharmacokinetic peak before beginning cognitive testing. First, 
participants completed the study phase of the Acquired Equivalence task (Experiment 1) 
with feedback. Then, participants completed two blocks of the Associative Memory Task 
(Experiment 2), consisting of encoding-distractor-test. Participants returned a week later 
(Week 2). Participants completed the Acquired Equivalence Test phase (Experiment 1) 





We recruited participants from the Columbia University and Columbia University 
Medical Campuses, with a protocol approved by the New York State Psychiatric Institute 
Institutional Review Board and Columbia University Morningside Campus Institutional 
Review Board. Participants were recruited, screened, consented and compensated, as 
described in Chapter 3. As described in Chapter 2, a total of 60 participants participated 
in Sessions 2 and 3 of the experiment (43 female; age: 24.75 ± 4.41; see Supplementary 
Table 1). 
 
Week 1 (encoding and same day test): The study physician administered either drug or 
placebo. 90 minutes after drug or placebo administration, participants completed the 
learning blocks of the Acquired Equivalence task (Experiment 1, see below), and two 
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blocks (encoding-distractor-test) of the Associative Memory task (Experiment 2, see 
below).  
 
Week 2 (delay test): First, participants competed the test phase of the Acquired 
Equivalence Task (Experiment 1). Then we conducted the delay condition of the 
Associative Memory Task (Experiment 2), testing the remaining objects pairs studied in 
Week 1.  
 
Experiment 1: Acquired Equivalence Task 
 
For this experiment, we tested to see if d-amphetamine modulates the integration of 
overlapping associations. The acquired equivalence task was designed to test how 
participants generalized across structures of associations learned through trial-by-trial 
feedback to novel recombinations of those associations, with higher levels of 
generalization as evidence of making choices across an integrated structure of 
associations.  
 
Stimuli: We used twelve pictures of female faces and twelve distinctive outdoor scenes 
(e.g. a beach, a snowy forest, a cityscape, et cetera). 
 
Pre-exposure Phase: Participants were pre-exposed to all twelve faces and twelve 
outdoor scene photos used as stimuli in the experiment. The participant was instructed to 
indicate if each stimulus was a person or place. For each trial, a stimulus (either a face or 
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a scene) was presented for 0.5 s, then the choice options “1 for person” and “2 for place” 
appeared underneath the stimulus photo for the 1.25 s choice interval to cue to 
participant’s response. Once a response was indicated, the chosen option became a 
brighter white and the non-chosen option disappeared for the duration of the choice 
interval. Each trial was separated by a fixation cross for 0.5 s. There were fifteen blocks 
of trials, in which each of the 24 stimuli were presented once in a random order, for a 
total of 360 pre-exposure trials. Other than a self-paced break followed the eighth block, 
there was no overt indication that the stimuli were presented in blocks.  
 
Learning Phase: While either on drug or placebo, participants were instructed “to learn 
which of the two pictures the person prefers” and that “in the beginning, you will have to 
guess which picture is correct. In time, through trial and error, you will learn which 
picture each person prefers. People may prefer more than one picture.” On each training 
trial, on a black background, we presented participants with a face at the top center of the 
screen for 0.5 s, and then two scenes appeared beneath the face picture for the 2.5 s 
choice interval; the two scenes were always paired together, each presented equally on 
the left and right sides. The participant’s choice was indicated by making the chosen 
scene appear brighter and the other scene appear darker for 0.5 s. Participants were then 
presented with deterministic feedback, either “Correct” in green or “Incorrect” in red, for 
1 s. If a participant did not respond within the choice interval or pressed a key other than 
1 or 2, we presented “Invalid Trial” in the center of the screen. Each trial was separated 
with a white fixation cross for 1 s.  
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Critically, these face-scene associations formed overlapping triads: for example, Face A 
was associated with Scene 1, Face B was also associated with Scene 1, and Face A was 
also associated with a second scene, Scene 2. This overlapping structure of associations 
allowed us to ask questions about how participants generalize across integrated 
associations to novel recombination (so here, did participants generalize the association 
to Face B also being associated with Scene 2?). Specifically, we could then test how d-
amphetamine during learning modulates this generalization; we predicted that increased 
dopamine would increase subsequent integration after consolidation. Other than warning 
participants that the “faces” may like more than one picture, no additional indication was 
given about the structure of associations within the task. In total, participants learned 
about six triads, each with one face and two scenes.  
 
Before the learning trials began, participants completed 20 practice trials that used other 
face and scene stimuli. To ensure that participants understood instructions, they had to be 
correct on at least 11 of the 20 practice trials; if not, the participant repeated the practice 
phase until criterion was met.   
 
Learning was separated into three blocks of 60 trials, for a total of 180 trials, separated by 
a self-paced break. Across all three blocks, each stimulus-association type was presented 
10 times.  
 
Test Phase: On week 2, while all participants were off drug, participants completed the 
test phase, in which all of the trained associations were tested, plus novel transfer trials 
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(in the example above, Face B with Scene 2). In the test phase, the trial structure was 
identical to the learning block, except that the feedback was omitted. The test phase 
consisted of two blocks of 48 test trials, separated by a self-paced break, for a total of 96 
test trials. Across the two test blocks, each trained association was tested four times, and 
each transfer trial was tested four times. In the transfer trials, the “lure” scene was always 
another scene that was associated with another face or faces, and the “lure” scene pair 
remained consistent for the entire test block. 
 
Post-test Phase: Immediately following the test phase, participants completed a 
computerized post-test questionnaire that tested for their explicit awareness of the 
associations and structures between the stimuli.  
 
First, participants completed a recognition test for the 12 face pictures and 12 scene 
pictures, plus an equal number of face and scene lures, with each stimulus presented once 
in a randomized order for a total of 48 trials. Participants were instructed, “You will now 
see a number of pictures, one at a time. Please indicate whether or not you saw each 
picture in this experiment.” On each trial, the stimuli appeared at the top of the screen for 
0.5 s, and then “1 Yes” (i.e. an old stimulus from the task) and “2 No” (i.e. a lure 
stimulus) appeared beneath the stimulus picture to indicate to participants that they could 




Next, we tested participants’ explicit knowledge of the scene stimuli pairs within the 
learned triad structures that had shared associations. Participants were instructed, “Some 
people liked more than one picture. You will now see pictures at the top of the screen, 
one at a time. You will also see three other pictures below it. Given what you have 
learned in this study, if you know a person likes the top picture, which picture from the 
bottom row do they also like?” On each trial, a scene stimulus was presented at the top of 
the screen for 0.5 s, and then the three choice options (scenes) appeared below the scene 
stimulus to indicate to the participant that the choice period had begun. Participants had 6 
s to choose a scene. Participants completed 12 trials, one for each presented scene, and 
each scene stimulus was also the correct answer once and a lure twice.  
 
Lastly, we tested participants’ explicit knowledge of the face stimuli pairs within the 
learned triad structures that had shared associations. Participants were instructed, “Some 
people like the same pictures. Which person in the bottom row likes the same pictures as 
the person at the top of the screen?” On each trial, a face stimulus was presented at the 
top of the screen for 0.5 s, and then the three choice options (faces) appeared below. 
Participants had 6 s to choose a face. Participants completed 12 trials, one for each 







Experiment 2: Associative Memory Task:   
 
First, participants were trained on all phases of the associative memory task: encoding, 
distractor, and test. During this training, participants were instructed that they would 
study pairs of objects and we would test their memory for those object pairs both on the 
same day and after a week delay.  
 
Encoding: During each encoding block, we presented participants with a series of trial-
unique objects pairs on a white background (3 s) to study, one pair at a time. For each 
object pair, participants were instructed to imagine a novel scenario that involved both 
objects; we encouraged participants to imagine vivid scenarios that involved both objects 
directly interacting. Importantly, for the trial-unique object pairs encoded, the left object 
picture (“A”) always repeated for two consecutive object pairs, so that these three objects 
formed an overlapping association that could potentially be integrated together (“A-B” 
“A-C”). Then “Vivid: 1 2 3 4” appeared on the screen, and participants had 1.5 s to 
indicate with the number keys the vividness of the imagined scenario on a scale from 1 
(“not very vivid”) to 4 (“very vivid”). The vividness rating chosen turned red for the 
duration of the rating interval, to indicate that the response had been received. Each 
encoding trial was separated by a fixation cross (duration: 0.5 – 3.0 s, mean(sd) = 1.32 s 
± 0.78). In each of the two encoding blocks, participants encoded and rated the vividness 
of 76 object pairs, for a total of 152 object pairs.   
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Memory Test: To test for the effects of drug on memory after a short versus long delay, 
we tested participants’ memory for half of the object pairs immediately following the 
distractor task and memory for the other half of the object pairs a week later. Participants 
were instructed that for the memory task, they would be tested on how well they could 
remember whether objects were paired together. We presented participants with pairs of 
objects that were either intact (two objects studied together), rearranged (two objects that 
were studied in different combinations), or new (participants were instructed that the 
pairs contained at least one new object, but in actuality we always presented two new 
objects), and participants had 3 s to indicate the type of combination – intact, rearranged, 
or new – for each test pair. Both the same day and week delay memory tests consisted of 
68 trials (20 intact trials, 28 rearranged trials and 20 new trials), for a total of 136 
memory trials. Each encoding trial was separated by a fixation cross (duration: 0.5 – 3.0 
s, mean(sd) = 1.32 s ± 0.78).  
 
Critically, to test whether dopamine modulates memory integration, we presented 
participants with two different types of rearranged trials – rearranged trials with an 
overlapping associate (“B-C”) (14 trials) and rearranged trials without an overlapping 
associate (14 trials) – so that we could compare the rate of incorrectly identifying the 






Distractor Task (Working Memory Task):  
 
To simultaneously insert a brief delay (approximately 3 min) between the encoding and 
same day memory tests and collect a measure of executive function during encoding, 
participants completed a short working memory test in between each encoding and the 
same day test blocks. This working memory test was a non-spatial adaption of McNab & 
Klingberg (2008) and performance on this type of task has been shown to be enhanced by 





The data were preprocessed in Matlab and analyses were conducted in the R 
programming language. We ran the analyses as regressions, with random effects when 
appropriate. We included all of the potential effects, except for when the model would 
not converge. We conducted the mediation analysis using the mediate package in R.  
 
All predictors were mean centered and scaled. For the models that included delay, the 
immediate condition was effect coded (-1 for the same day condition; 1 for the week 









In Experiment 1, to test if increase levels of dopamine increased memory integration, we 
used a variant of the acquired equivalence task (Shohamy & Wagner, 2008) and this task 
structure allowed us to test participants on novel recombinations of the trained 
associations, which depends on the integration of the overlapping associations. In the 
study phase, while on either d-amphetamine or placebo, we instructed participants to 
learn which scene picture a given face preferred using trial-and-error feedback. On each 
trial, participants saw a face with two scenes below, chose one of the two scene pictures, 
and were given feedback on whether their choice was correct (see Figure 2). Critically, 
triads of these face-scene pairs had overlapping associations that created a covert 
structure – two different faces were separately associated with the same scene and one of 
the faces was additionally associated with a second scene – and participants were not 
made explicitly aware of this structure. To dissociate the effects of the effect of the drug 
on learning separately from the effects of drug on retrieval and generalization, 
participants were tested a week later while off drug. The studied task structure allowed us 
to test these learned associations in two different ways: participants were tested on all of 
the previously trained associations with no feedback, so that we could test how d-




Figure 2. Experiment 1: acquired equivalence task (a) Phase 1: study with feedback - 
Week 1. Participants were instructed to learn “which picture each person prefers” using 
trial and error feedback. Participants were presented with a face at the top of the screen 
and two scene pictures below. The participant then had 2.5 s to select a scene. Then, 
feedback (“correct” in green or “incorrect” in red) appeared for 1 s. Each trial was 
separated by a 1 s fixation cross. (b) Underlying structure of associations. Critically, the 
person-scene associations that participants learned had overlapping associations forming 
a triad of pairs, such that if Person A was associated with Scene 1, Person B was also 
associated with Scene 1, and Person A was associated with Scene 2. Participants learned 
about six triads, each containing 2 faces and 2 scenes. (c) Phase 2: test (no feedback) - 
Week 2. Participants were tested on all of the trained associations studied during Phase 1, 
as well as transfer trials of novel face-scene pairs (for example, Person B with Scene 2). 
Higher transfer rates are a measure of greater hippocampus dependent integration. Task 
timing was identical, except that feedback was omitted. 
 
 
First, we wanted to test if dopamine level during the Study Phase modulates learning 
performance. When we tested if d-amphetamine level (mg d-amphetamine/kg 
bodyweight) while learning from feedback modulated performance, we did not detect an 
effect of drug on overall study performance (β = 0.19, SE = 0.66, z = 0.29, p = 0.78, see 
Figure 3a) or learning rate (logistic regression: β = -0.30, SE = 0.38, z = -0.79, p = 0.43), 
suggesting that d-amphetamine does not modulate learning from feedback. Similarly, 
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there was no effect of d-amphetamine on reaction times on correct trials (β = 0.070, SE = 
0.21, t = 0.33, p = 0.82, see Figure 3a).  
 
Participants returned a week later and were tested without feedback on all of the trained 
associations with novel generalization trials interspersed amongst the trained trials, to test 
whether drug level during learning modulated test performance after time for 
consolidation. Increased levels of d-amphetamine during learning resulted in significantly 
greater accuracy on trained trials (β = 2.01, SE = 0.90, z = 2.23, p = 0.026), showing that 
the effects of d-amphetamine during learning emerge only after a delay (see Figure 3b). 
Additionally, to see if dopamine at encoding modulated how accessible the associations 
were later, and we tested this by seeing if drug levels during training predicted reaction 
times at test. We found a marginally significant effect of d-amphetamine on reaction 
times: higher d-amphetamine during encoding resulted in slower reaction times at test a 
week later (β = 0.61, SE = 0.33, t = 1.84, p = 0.064; see Figure 3b), which suggests that 
dopamine facilitates slower retrieval of learned associations after consolidation. 
 
Next, we wanted to test dopamine increases the integration of overlapping association, so 
we tested if increased d-amphetamine levels during learning resulted in greater levels of 
transfer on the novel generalization trials, which would be more likely to occur if the 
overlapping associations were integrated. We did not detect an effect of drug on 
generalization (β = 0.69, SE = 0.64, z = 1.09, p = 0.28; see Figure 3c). Further, we did not 
detect an effect of drug level on reaction times for the generalization trials (β = 0.086, SE 
= 0.051, t = 1.69, p = 0.011; see Figure 3c). Together, these results suggest that increased 
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levels of d-amphetamine during study results in enhancement of memory for the 
associations that were learned, but it does not increase the integration of those 






Figure 3. Experiment 1: D-amphetamine at study enhances performance on trained trials 
when performance is tested a week later. (a) Phase 1: Study (with feedback). We did not 
detect an effect of drug on participants study performance (β = 0.19, SE = 0.66, z = 0.29, 
p = 0.78; left) or reaction times (β = 0.070, SE = 0.21, t = 0.33, p = 0.82; right; correct 
trials). (b) Phase 2: Trained Trials. At test, performance on trained trials was enhanced by 
d-amphetamine (β = 2.01, SE = 0.90, z = 2.23, p = 0.026; left) and reaction times on 
correct trials were marginally slower as drug level increased (β = 0.61, SE = 0.33, t = 
1.84, p = 0.064; right). (c) Phase 2: Transfer Trials. We did not detect a significant effect 
of drug on transfer trials (β = 0.69, SE = 0.64, z = 1.09, p = 0.28; left) or transfer trial 
reaction times (β = 0.086, SE = 0.051, t = 1.69, p = 0.011; right). 
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Experiment 2  
 
In addition to testing how dopamine modulates learning from feedback and the 
integration of that learning, in Experiment 2, we used a very different experimental 
paradigm that also tested memory integration (see Figure 4a-b). Specifically, participants 
memorized a series of trial-unique object pairs, by imagining a vivid scenario that 
involved both objects directly interacting. Importantly, to test for the effects of d-
amphetamine on memory integration, the left object (“A”) in each trial always repeated 
for two consecutive trials, so that the two objects on the right (B and C) could potentially 
be integrated. After encoding, participants performed a 3 min “distractor task.” For the 
memory test, we tested participants’ memory for the object pairs: participants saw objects 
pairs and were instructed to indicate if they were intact (two objects studied together in 
that combination), rearranged (two objects studied in different combinations), or new (at 
least one new object). Critically, to test whether dopamine modulates memory 
integration, we presented participants with two different types of rearranged trials – 
rearranged trials with an overlapping associate and rearranged trials without an 
overlapping associate – so that we could compare the rate of incorrectly identifying the 
rearranged pairs as intact with and without the possibility of integration.  
 
The critical question that we wanted to ask is whether d-amphetamine at time of encoding 
modulates memory integration. We hypothesized that increased levels of dopamine at 
encoding would result in greater integration of the A-B, A-C object pairs, and therefore, 
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participants would be more likely to incorrectly call rearranged pairs with a shared 
associate (B-C pairs) ‘intact’, compared to rearranged pairs without a shared associate. 
When we tested if d-amphetamine differentially modulated the rate of false alarms for the 
shared associate rearranged pairs compared to the rearranged pairs, we did not detect any 
modulation of drug in either the same day condition (β = -0.0032, SE = 0.028, t = -0.11, p 
= 0.91) or the week delay condition (β = -0.0041, SE = 0.026, t = -0.16, p = 0.87). 
Converging with the results of Experiment 1, this suggests that increasing a dopamine 






Figure 4. Experiment 2: task structure and results. (a) Associative Memory Task. 
Participants were instructed to deliberately encode pairs of object stimuli with a vivid 
scenario that involved both objects directly interacting (3 s) and then they rated the 
vividness of the association they generated (1.5 s) (top). Object pairs were always unique 
combinations of objects, but the first object (object A) repeated for two consecutive trials 
(with objects B and C) to create overlapping pairs of associations.  (b) Then at test, 
participant were presented with pairs of objects and their task was to indicate (3 s) if the 
object pairs were intact (two old objects studied in that combination), rearranged (two old 
object studied in different combinations) or new (at least one new object). Critically, 
there were two types of rearranged trials: trials in which the objects had a shared 
associate (the B/C pairs) or trials where they did not. (c). If dopamine increases memory 
integration for overlapping stimuli, then we would expect to see a higher rate of false 
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alarms for the B/C rearranged pairs compared to the non-overlapping rearranged pairs. 
However, we did not detect a difference in false alarm rate between the B/C rearranged 
pairs and the rearranged pairs, either when memory was tested same day (β = -0.0032, SE 
= 0.028, t = -0.11, p = 0.91) or after a week delay (β = -0.0041, SE = 0.026, t = -0.16, p = 





Across two different paradigms, we found that d-amphetamine level at time of encoding 
enhances memory for the trained associations, but d-amphetamine levels did not affect 
hippocampus dependent memory integration. These results converge using two very 
different tasks, in which the associations were learned through either trial-and-error 
feedback or deliberate deep encoding, when integration was tested either through 
generalization or false alarms, and when integration was tested after either a short or long 
delay. These results suggest that the neurotransmitter dopamine is important in 
facilitating memory enhancement for distinct associations, but it does not modulate 
integrative encoding.  
 
One limitation of this study is that it is difficult to confidently interpret a null result; 
however, we do find a similar lack of integration across two different tasks, which 
provides stronger evidence that increasing dopamine levels does not increase memory 
integration. More so, a recent paper looking at memory integration finds similar results, 
again suggesting that pharmacologically manipulating dopamine levels does not 
modulate memory integration. However, future research will be needed to test if 
dopamine has an effect on memory integration in other contexts.  
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Integrated memories may help to guide future behavior by facilitating generalization in 
novel situations, but memory integration may also maladaptively cause specific memory 
mistakes, in which aspects of separate but related experiences are confused. Therefore, 
sometimes it is preferential to encode events as being distinct to minimize memory errors 



















The purpose of the work presented in this dissertation was to better understand how 
memories for motivationally relevant information are prioritized and integrated, the 
timing over which these effects emerge, and the brain mechanisms that underlie these 
mnemonic changes. This discussion will summarize and integrate the results reported 
herein in the context of adaptive memory. I then propose a putative brain mechanism for 
dopamine-mediated adaptive memory and discuss the results within the broader context 
of memory modulation, with special attention to the ways that memories are biased, 
transformed, and differentially encoded. Finally, since it is hypothesized that 
motivationally relevant memories are prioritized to guide future choices, I will discuss 
adaptive memory in the context of decision making. Each of these sections will raise 
outstanding issues and directions for future research.  
 
Summary and integration of results 
 
In Chapter 2, I tested whether and how rewards could retroactively modulate memory. To 
test this, I designed a novel behavioral paradigm utilizing rich spatio-temporal encoding, 
which allowed me to test both whether rewards retroactively enhanced memory and also 
which memories were prioritized. We found that when memory was tested after a delay, 
rewards retroactively prioritized memories, such that memory for the items immediately 
preceding the reward were remembered best. Consistent with models of hippocampal 
replay (Buhry, Azizi, & Cheng, 2011; Buzsáki, 2015; Carr et al., 2011; Foster & Wilson, 
2006; Wilson & McNaughton, 1994a), we found that two distinct post-encoding time 
periods were necessary for this effect: first, a period of rest immediately following 
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encoding, and second, a longer overnight consolidation that may involve sleep. We 
replicated the effect of reward on memory for proximal events in six separate datasets 
and additionally demonstrated that this effect is not due to the location of the maze 
outcome or active rehearsal during the rest breaks.  
 
In the framework of adaptive memory, rewards – and by extension dopamine – are 
hypothesized to play a critical role in selecting motivationally relevant memories to be 
prioritized (Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 2011; Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). 
Motivated by this and research demonstrating dopamine-mediated long-term potentiation 
in cellular recordings (U. Frey et al., 1990; U. Frey & Morris, 1997), in Chapter 3, we 
wanted to test whether dopamine enhances memory in humans. To test this, we used a 
pharmacological intervention that showed increased levels of a dopamine agonist, d-
amphetamine, enhanced memory for hippocampus dependent associative memory, both 
when memory was tested on the same day or after a week delay. But the means by which 
d-amphetamine enhanced associative memory varied as a function of when memory was 
tested: memory tested after a short delay was best accounted for by working memory 
performance, while memory tested after a week delay was directly predicted by the drug 
level at time of encoding, consistent with predictions made from research on dopamine 
mediated long term potentiation (Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 2011; 
Shohamy & Adcock, 2010).  
 
In Chapter 4, we wanted to test whether dopamine contributes to the integration of 
overlapping memories. To test this, we pharmacologically manipulated dopamine levels 
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using the dopamine agonist, d-amphetamine, and tested the effect on two different 
behavioral paradigms, in which participants learned about overlapping stimuli – either by 
learning from trial-and-error learning (Experiment 1) or by deliberate encoding of object 
pairs (Experiment 2) – and then tested for evidence of the integration of these 
overlapping associations. In both of these experiments, we found that d-amphetamine 
enhanced memory for items that were directly encoded, but we did not detect an effect of 
d-amphetamine on memory integration.  
 
Together, these experiments suggest that memory for motivationally relevant information 
is prioritized, dopamine enhances performance across different memory and learning 
systems, the effect of both reward and dopamine on memory and learning emerge after 
delay, and dopamine does not bias the hippocampus to encode memories in an integrated 
manner. The next section will integrate the results of these experiments, focusing on the 
role of consolidation, rewards and dopamine, and associative structures in memory.  
 
Reward and dopamine Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that signals novelty and salience 
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). In recent years, extensive converging evidence has 
demonstrated its role in signaling unpredicted rewards (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; 
Glimcher, 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Rutledge et al., 2010; Schultz et al., 1997), with 
possibly a broader role in signaling other errors in prediction (Gershman & Schoenbaum, 
2017). Remembering the events surrounding an unexpected reward is likely to be 
adaptively advantageous, as these memories could improve predictions for future 
rewards. Chapters 3 and 4 manipulated dopamine levels pharmacologically, 
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demonstrating that dopamine enhances both memory and learned stimulus-response 
associations. Given the well-established role of dopamine in signaling unexpected 
rewards, the reward outcomes that modulated the retroactive reward proximity effect 
reported in Chapter 2 are likely to be signaled with dopamine. Therefore, since the 
experiment in Chapter 3 demonstrated direct dopamine dependent enhancement of 
memory, we hypothesize that the retroactive reward proximity effect is driven by 
intrinsic dopaminergic modulation, but this will need to be tested directly by 
pharmacologically lowering dopamine levels. 
 
Consolidation Across all of the experiments reported, we found that time and opportunity 
for consolidation were critical for the effects of either reward or dopamine to emerge. In 
Chapter 2, when memory was tested immediately, we found that reward generally 
enhanced memory for the preceding maze; however, after 24-hours we found a different 
pattern – memory for the items closest to the reward was selectively prioritized.  
 
In Chapter 3, we found that dopamine enhanced memory differentially when tested at 
different times. When associative memory was tested after a short delay, working 
memory performance mediated the effects of d-amphetamine on associative memory; 
however, when associative memory was tested after a long delay, d-amphetamine had a 
direct effect on memory. In Chapter 4, while we did not detect an effect of d-
amphetamine on performance during learning; but when we tested performance after a 




Together, these studies suggest that across many different types of learning – incidental 
encoding, rich deliberate encoding, and stimulus-response learning – dopamine and 
reward consistently transform memories over time. This pattern is consistent with 
research on long term potentiation that suggests that late phase long term potentiation 
emerges only after a delay, as it depends on protein synthesis and is enhanced by 
dopamine (U. Frey & Morris, 1997; Redondo & Morris, 2011; Rogerson, Cai, Frank, 
Sano, Shobe, Lopez-Aranda, & Silva, 2014b). However, changes induced by these 
relatively slow to emerge effects are more stable and durable, with the effects lasting 
longer than the fast, early phase long term potentiation (E. P. Huang, 1998). According to 
the framework of adaptive memory, motivationally modulated memories are 
differentially consolidated to influence decisions in the future (Shohamy & Adcock, 
2010), and thus the ability to remember the adaptively modulated memories for days or 
weeks is critical. 
 
Hippocampus dependent associations and structures One of the fundamental 
computations performed by the hippocampus is the ability to encode associations 
between stimuli – across space, time and other dimensions – which can form larger 
structures of information (Dusek & Eichenbaum, 1997; Staresina & Davachi, 2009). 
Capitalizing on this feature of the hippocampus, we designed all of the experiments 
reported in this dissertation so that the information encoded could be stored in associative 
or structured representations. In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that rewards retroactively 
prioritize memory for a sequence of objects preceding reward that linked across both time 
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and space. In Chapter 3, participants deliberately created links between novel object 
pairs, so we could test their memory for those associations. And in Chapter 4, in two 
different experiments, participants learned about overlapping structures of associations, 
using either trial and error learning or rich deliberate encoding, so that we could test to 
see how dopamine modulated the integration of those associations.  
 
Since we found that dopamine improves memory for associations (Chapter 3), this raises 
questions about how dopamine modulates cognitive maps and other large structures of 
associations. Specifically, because we showed that rewards (and putatively dopamine) 
retroactively prioritize recognition memory for proximal items (Chapter 2); it is possible 
that rewards also retroactively modulate memory for associations across the structure of 
the maze. This raises three predictions: first, that we would find stronger associative 
memory linking objects together in the rewarded compared to the non-rewarded mazes; 
second, that the associations closest to the reward will be more likely to be remembered 
or remembered more strongly; and third, that collectively these changes might transform 
the “cognitive map” of the environment to preferentially warp the representation of the 
area proximal to reward. Although we did not explicitly test associative memory in 
Chapter 2, we have indirect evidence in support of these predictions: spatial memory, 
which might be a proxy for measuring memory of the cognitive map, is also retroactively 
modulated by reward. This suggests that motivation, in addition to enhancing memory, 




In addition to motivation modulating the structural associations or cognitive map in 
memory, these cognitive maps may be transformed in other ways. For example, memory 
integration is another way by which the associative structure of memories is transformed, 
which has implications both for how those memories are integrated and how they are 
used to guide subsequent decisions. In the “matrix experiments” (Chapter 2), we did not 
test for memory integration, but from the results of the two experiments in Chapter 4, we 
would predict that memory for the events within a maze would not be differentially 
integrated by reward. One possibility is that having the representation of each maze step 
stored as a relatively distinct node linked with other nodes by associations may 
adaptively allow for more flexible behavior – for example taking a shortcut or searching 
for food items instead of gold coins – that would be impaired if the memory for the 
rewarded mazes were overly integrated.  
 
Despite research predicting that dopamine facilitates increased memory integration in 
humans, in Chapter 4, we surprisingly did not detect an effect of dopamine on memory 
integration. This raises questions about when memory integration occurs, how the 
hippocampus supports such integration, and what factors bias the hippocampus to encode 
relationships in a relatively separate versus integrated manner. One possibility is that the 
tasks we chose were ill suited to measure the effect of dopamine on memory integration. 
In particular, for the A-B/A-C Associative Memory Task, we used the rate at which 
participants mistakenly identified a rearranged object pair with a shared associated as 
evidence for integration. Therefore, with this task design there is a tradeoff between 
memory for the associations and evidence for memory integration. Future research is 
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needed to determine if, in situations where memory integration is not directly competing 
with memory for the exemplars, dopamine enhances memory integration, and to 
understand, if dopamine does not modulate memory integration, what other brain 
mechanisms bias memories to be encoded in a relatively distinct or relatively overlapping 
manner.  
 
Putative brain mechanisms supporting the retroactive prioritization of memory by reward 
The precise mechanism by which the hippocampus encodes sequences of events is not 
known. However, studies of spatial exploration in rodents have revealed compelling 
physiological mechanisms: hippocampal place cells are well known to represent the 
spatial position of an animal as it explores a maze (Ekstrom et al., 2003; E. I. Moser, 
Kropff, & Moser, 2008; O'Keefe, 1976; 1979; O'Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971). Critically, 
after navigation (while the animal rests or sleeps), hippocampal neurons replay the 
sequence of activity that unfolded during navigation (O'Neill et al., 2010; Pezzulo, van 
der Meer, Lansink, & Pennartz, 2014; Roumis & Frank, 2015). This replay activity is 
thought to strengthen memory for the sequence of places explored during navigation 
(Carr et al., 2011; Nakashiba, Buhl, McHugh, & Tonegawa, 2009a). Moreover, reward 
has been shown to increase replay immediately following exploration, suggesting that 
replay may contribute specifically to the strengthening of memory for neutral events that 
were followed by reward (Ambrose et al., 2016; Singer & Frank, 2009). Together, these 
data suggest that post-reward replay of events could provide a mechanism for retroactive 
modulation of sequences of events preceding the reward.  
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The demonstration of physiological replay generates predictions about which specific 
past events are likely to be prioritized in memory (Atherton et al., 2015). Replay of 
spatial trajectories in hippocampal neurons are thought to be important for memory 
(Ambrose et al., 2016; Carr et al., 2011; Foster & Wilson, 2007; Ji & Wilson, 2007b; 
Nakashiba, Buhl, McHugh, & Tonegawa, 2009b). Critically, during rest periods 
following spatial exploration in animals, hippocampal replay often happens in reverse: 
this reverse replay starts with the events at the end of the maze and plays back the 
trajectory from that point, “rewinding” the path that was taken (Ambrose et al., 2016; 
Diba & Buzsáki, 2007; Foster & Wilson, 2006). Conversely, during active behavior, 
forward replay events traverse possible future trajectories (Johnson & Redish, 2007a; 
Ólafsdóttir et al., 2015; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2014). Replay immediately following a maze 
has been shown to occur concurrently with midbrain dopamine neurons firing, potentially 
allowing reward information to back-propagate to more distal spatial locations or 
decision points that preceded it (Gomperts et al., 2015), and this dopaminergic input may 
selectively increase plasticity for the sequence of events that precede reward (Atherton et 
al., 2015; Brzosko et al., 2015). Together, this suggests a physiological mechanism by 
which reward could retroactively enhance memory for sequences of neutral events that 
preceded it and that there should be a graded effect of reward on memory that would be 
strongest for those events closest in time and space to the reward itself.  
 
Replay data from rodents also suggest that the retroactive effects of reward on memory 
may require time for consolidation before their effects manifest in behavior. Extensive 
research has demonstrated the important role of sleep for replay and for memory 
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consolidation (Diekelmann & Born, 2010; Stickgold & Walker, 2013; Wilson & 
McNaughton, 1994b). In rodents, replay has also been shown in periods of quiescence 
immediately following exploration (Ambrose et al., 2016; Foster & Wilson, 2006; Singer 
& Frank, 2009) and studies suggest that replay at both time points (immediate post-
exploration rest and later sleep) is necessary for learning (Girardeau et al., 2009; Jadhav 
et al., 2012; Stengel & Wilson, 2010). These findings are consistent with the idea that 
replay that occurs immediately after encoding may “tag” events for later consolidation 
(U. Frey & Morris, 1997; Lisman et al., 2011; Redondo & Morris, 2011), and increase 
the associated replay during sleep (McNamara et al., 2014). This suggests that the time 
window immediately after reward receipt (seconds) as well as the longer time window 
during sleep after learning (hours) may work jointly to prioritize sequences of events that 
lead to subsequent reward.  
 
Together, these results form a framework by which an animal navigates through a space 
and receives a reward. During the period of quiescence that follows the navigation, while 
the animal consumes the reward, the hippocampus replays the previous trajectory very 
quickly in reverse, with greater rates of replay for larger rewards. This replay occurs in 
tandem with midbrain firing and putative release of dopamine in the hippocampus, which 
results in increase long-term potentiation of the memories and possibly linking 
information about the reward to the preceding events and is then further consolidated 
during sleep.  
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The results of the experiments reported in Chapter 2 are consistent with the behavioral 
predictions that emerge from this model: memory specifically for the events leading up to 
a reward were retroactively prioritized and the reward proximity effect depended on time 
for post-encoding replay and overnight consolidation. Yet, further research is needed to 
explicitly test the neurobiological predictions that emerge from this putative brain 
mechanism in humans using the “matrix” task.  
 
The putative brain mechanism suggests that the dopaminergic reward signal is back 
propagated to potentiate memory for the preceding events via reverse hippocampal replay 
in the rest breaks following each maze. Therefore, the first prediction generated by this 
model is that the neurotransmitter dopamine is necessary for the retroactive reward 
proximity effect. Therefore, we could test the necessity of dopamine for the reward 
proximity effect by administering a dopamine antagonist before encoding and testing to 
see if this attenuates the reward proximity effect, to see if dopamine modulates the 
retroactive prioritization of memory and post-encoding consolidation.  
 
Although we cannot measure hippocampal replay or other neuronal activity in healthy 
participants, by collecting functional neuroimaging data during the task, we can measure 
post-encoding functional reactivation (Staresina et al., 2013; Tambini et al., 2010) during 
the rest blocks following each maze. Using the post-encoding functional reactivation as a 
proxy for hippocampal replay, we can then test whether there is greater reactivation 
following reward mazes compared to no reward mazes and additionally test whether the 
amount of reactivation predicts individual differences in memory. Additionally, 
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coordinated activity between the hippocampus and reward areas may retroactively back 
propagate reward information to cause the reward proximity effect. We can test this 
prediction by seeing if there is increased functional connectivity between the hippocampi 
and the reward areas following reward compared to no reward mazes, and if greater 
hippocampal-dopaminergic midbrain connectivity predicts a greater reward proximity 
effect on a subject-by-subject basis. Since rewards increase reverse hippocampal replay, 
by combining the pharmacological dopamine antagonist manipulation with fMRI, we 
could additionally test whether the effects of the antagonist on memory are mediated by 
dopamine.  
 
Functional neuroimaging can only provide a proxy measurement for hippocampal replay. 
In humans, the only way to measure neuronal firing is using intracranial 
electrophysiology in patient populations, and such recordings would provide vastly 
improved spatial and temporal resolution compared to fMRI. To date, although the short 
wave ripple waveform that hippocampal replay events are imbedded in have been 
recorded (Buzsáki, 2015), hippocampal replay itself has not yet been recorded in humans. 
However, linking reward modulated post-encoding neuronal activity and memory 
performance would be the most direct test of the role of hippocampal replay as the 
putative brain mechanism support the effect and would help the field better understand 





Memory modulation: selection, biases, and forgetting 
 
The ways in which memories are represented can vary ranging from vividly encoded 
unique episodes to highly abstracted representations, and factors such as motivation can 
transform and bias these representations. The research presented in this dissertation 
focused on two mechanisms by which memory representations are transformed, first 
showing that items associated with reward or dopamine were systematically remembered 
better and second showing that dopamine does not modulate how the degree to which 
memories are represented in an integrated versus relatively distinct manner. Memory 
researchers often discuss memory modulation as a single unified process; however, 
memory can be modulated through many different mechanisms. These distinct 
mechanisms are likely to each transform memories differentially, with implications for 
how the information is late recalled and how the information could be used to guide 
subsequent decisions. The following section will discuss some ways in which memories 
can be modulated, considered within the context of how memory transformation may 
influence memory guided decision making.  
 
Affective modulation of memory Although the research discussed in this dissertation 
focused on the role of rewards and dopamine on memory modulation, affective and 
emotional responses more broadly also signal motivationally relevant information and 
simultaneously modulate memory (McGaugh, 2013). There is an extensive literature in 
affective neuroscience exploring how different emotions are instantiated by distinct brain 
mechanisms and these emotions differentially modulate memory through distinct brain 
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mechanisms. To simplify this vast complexity, one common framework used to 
empirically study affect deconstructs emotions into two key dimensions, arousal and 
valance (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004), both of which have effects on memory. For 
example, high emotional arousal results in a tradeoff in the aspects of a memory that are 
remembered, such that focal memory is enhanced at the expense of memory for the 
surrounding context, and this is thought to be regulated by both cortisol and 
norepinephrine (Kensinger, 2009; Mather & Sutherland, 2011). Relatedly, stress (e.g. 
manipulated through a cold presser) biases how memories are encoded, often with a non-
monotonic relationship between stress and hippocampus dependent recollection, such that 
moderate levels of cortisol have the highest rate of recollection (McCullough, Ritchey, 
Ranganath, & Yonelinas, 2015), and very high levels of stress, such as those caused by 
running a marathon, result in impaired explicit memory but also improved implicit 
memory (Eich & Metcalfe, 2009). This dissertation describes the effects of positively 
valance outcomes (i.e. reward) on memory, but negative valences (e.g. fear) can also 
result in the selective modulation of memory that becomes more pronounced over delays 
(Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015), even retroactively modulating memory (Dunsmoor et al., 
2015). Each of these different mechanisms of emotional modulation of memory is likely 
to transform the memory in distinct patterns, and therefore an important area of future 
research will be to explore the implications of this for subsequent decision making.  
 
The role of forgetting in adaptive memory. The framework of adaptive memory has 
primarily focused on how motivational manipulations enhance memory. While 
remembering things that are related to rewards and other motivationally relevant 
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outcomes is likely to facilitate future choices, forgetting is also likely to be crucial in 
facilitating adaptive behavior. In Chapter 2, we found that rewards retroactive modulated 
memory, resulting a selective prioritization for the preceding objects; however, since we 
did not detect an overall enhancement of memory when memory was tested after 
consolidation, it suggests that memory was selectively allocated to the prioritized items at 
the expense of the other forgotten items. 
 
Research suggests that fruit flies have a small subset of neurons that specifically promote 
forgetting (Davis & Zhong, 2017). Interestingly, they show that the forgetting that these 
memories promote is necessary for updating learning and flexible behavior (Shuai et al., 
2015), which suggests that forgetting may be an active, biologically-regulated process 
that facilitates adaptive behavior (Hardt, Nader, Nadel, 2013, 2013). Similarly, 
neurogenesis research in rodents has shown that there is a trade-off between remembering 
past events and encoding new events: decreasing neurogenesis results in an impoverished 
ability to encode new memories, but the spares old memories and the reverse pattern is 
found when neurogenesis is increased (Akers et al., 2014; Epp, Mera, Köhler, Josselyn, 
& Frankland, 2016; Frankland, Köhler, & Josselyn, 2013). These are just two examples 
that suggest that forgetting is an active biological process that facilitates updating 
expectations and flexibly adjusting to changes in the environment.    
 
In situations consisting of highly similar, overlapping experiences – such as a waiter 
serving dinners night after night – forgetting old, irrelevant memories may minimize 
interference from competing memories, thereby reducing decision mistakes – such as 
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serving the wrong dinner to a table. However, these negative consequences of poor 
memory for both items can be mitigated through phenomena such as retrieval induced 
forgetting, in which recalling one of two related memories causes forgetting in the non-
retrieved memory (Wimber, Alink, Charest, Kriegeskorte, & Anderson, 2015) to reduce 
future interference.  
 
Finally, in aversive situations, it may be adaptive to selectively forget experiences, which 
may be especially important for experiences that may need to be repeated in the future. 
For example, two years after giving birth, women remember the physical pain and 
anxiety experienced during childbirth as being significantly lower than they did 
immediately after birth (Stadlmayr et al., 2009), which presumably makes future 
pregnancies more likely. Conversely, having an extremely vivid and accessible memory 
for a traumatic event can be extremely debilitating, interfering with day-to-day 
functioning, as seen in patients with PTSD (Brewin, 2013; Rubin, Berntsen, & Klindt 
Bohni, 2008).  
 
Adaptive memory and its implication for adaptive behavior 
 
A crucial component of the adaptive memory framework is that memory for 
motivationally relevant events are modulated to facilitate future decisions. However, 
despite a growing body of research showing that memory related to things that ought to 
be important for future decisions, such as rewards, is enhanced, little research has tested 
if adaptively remembered information actually causes more adaptive choice behavior in 
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humans. Therefore, the field first needs to determine if adaptive memory improves 
subsequent choices. If it does, the critical next step will be to examine the ways that 
memories are selectively transformed – remembered better, actively forgotten, 
represented differently – and how such transformations from an unadulterated “veridical” 
representation of experience have implications for future choice behavior.  
 
Memory, the hippocampus, and decision making An increasing amount of research 
suggests that the hippocampus, traditionally associated with episodic memory and spatial 
mapping, is actively involved in supporting decision making in humans. Although 
research studying reward learning and decision making has focused on the reward 
circuits, including the striatum, orbital frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and the 
influence of midbrain dopamine neurons (Yin, Ostlund, & Balleine, 2008), the 
hippocampus is also involved in supporting choice behavior. Consistent with the idea that 
the hippocampus is important for binding associations across temporal gaps (Davachi, 
2006b), the hippocampus is implicated in supporting learning from feedback when the 
feedback is presented at a delay (Foerde & Shohamy, 2011; Foerde, Race, & Verfaellie, 
2013). In another example, when making economic decisions – for example, between 
familiar food choices – people may sample previous memories to guide their choice 
(Bakkour, Zylberberg, Shadlen, & Shohamy, 2018; Bornstein & Norman, 2017; 
Bornstein, Khaw, Shohamy, & Daw, 2017; Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016) or explicitly use 
their memory for reward values to guide choice (Duncan & Shohamy, 2016). 
Additionally, the hippocampus extract patterns from the environment (Schapiro, Gregory, 
Landau, McCloskey, & Turk-Browne, 2014; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & 
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Norman, 2017), creates associations between learned stimuli that can be used to guide 
subsequent decisions in novel scenarios that have not been experienced directly 
(Shohamy & Wagner, 2008; Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012), and encodes associative 
cognitive maps – both spatial and abstract – (Barron, Dolan, & Behrens, 2013; 
Eichenbaum, 2017; Garvert, Dolan, & Behrens, 2017; E. I. Moser et al., 2008; 
Stachenfeld et al., 2017; Tolman, 1948), all of which are like to facilitate predictions that 
guide behavior.  
 
Memory biases and decision making In most of the decision making literature that 
involves either the hippocampus or memory dependent decision making, it is tacitly 
assumed that memory is a veridical representation of experience and the environment. 
However, as this dissertation has hopefully shown, motivational relevance systematically 
biases what is remembered and how it is remembered. Critically, if the adaptive memory 
framework is correct, these systematic biases in memory should lead to systematic 
differences in subsequent choice behavior. The next section will discuss a few ways in 
which memory biases or the way a memory is represented may influence subsequent 
decision making, all of which will require future research.  
 
Memory biases and models of accumulated evidence of memory One model of choice 
behavior suggests that when making a decision people sample from evidence, 
accumulating evidence until a threshold is met and a choice is made. For decisions in 
which the only evidence comes from previous experience, memory might provide the 
evidence that the model samples from (Bakkour et al., 2018; Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016). 
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In these models it is almost facetiously obvious that one cannot sample from previous 
experiences that are not remembered. Research presented in this dissertation and 
elsewhere suggests that motivationally relevant outcomes – such as reward – 
systematically bias these memories to be remembered, and thus such memories are 
available to be sample and guide choice, which will bias sampling and thus choice toward 
outcomes that were previously rewarding.  
 
Additionally, the way that the experiences are represented in memory is also likely to 
bias both memory retrieval (i.e. sampling) and also the content of the memory. For 
example, if one chooses between three similarly valued treats with lots of previous 
experience, the way that those experiences are represented in memory may be very 
different. For example, if the first treat was eaten over and over in very similar 
circumstances, it is likely that the memory for all of those experiences will be integrated 
into a single abstract representation without memory of any single instance. Compare this 
highly integrated memory to the second treat that was mostly eaten in isolated events. 
While the unique memories of the second treat are likely to be much more vivid, finding 
those memories to sample them might be much more difficult. Compare this to the third 
treat that involves very distinct events that all share a common associate; the memories 
are relatively vivid and having a shared associate makes it easier to recall many 
memories. Together, these examples raise issues that suggest that the way memories are 
represented is likely to bias what and how readily previous experiences are sampled and 
the relative abstraction or specificity of those sample memories, which in turn is likely to 
bias the evidence that they contribute to this choice.  
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Memory biases and cognitive maps and models of the world Another area of decision 
making where transformed or biased memory representations are likely to have 
implications for choice behavior is related to cognitive maps or models of the world. 
Given the hippocampus’ role in spatial mapping and relational encoding, this region is 
especially well suited to encode spatial maps of the world, which can be stored to 
facilitate flexible choices, and are likely to encode other more abstract models of the 
environment. Typically, decision making research assumes that these models are already 
learned and that they represent a faithful representation of the actual environment. 
However, as anyone who has ever gotten lost in London knows, learning these cognitive 
maps and models is often non-trivial and prone to errors in memory. The research 
presented in Chapter 2 showing that spatial memory is retroactively modulated by reward 
is one example where memory for such a map is biased towards remembering places that 
are proximal to rewards, with higher levels of errors elsewhere in the environment. In 
another example, the boundaries between events and conditions change the remembered 
distance between two events, so if I represent “Manhattan” as one event and “Brooklyn” 
as another event, then I am likely to misrepresent these two places in memory as being 
much farther apart than they are in actuality, which again is likely to bias the choices that 
depend on this information.  
 
Memory biases and prospection In addition to its well-established role in supporting 
memory and spatial navigation, hippocampus’s flexible relational encoding has also been 
shown to be important for imagining novel scenarios, for example a picturing a friend 
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from your childhood visiting your workplace (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Buckner 
& Carroll, 2007; Palombo, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2015; Peters & Büchel, 2010; Race, 
Keane, & Verfaellie, 2013). The ability to imagine scenarios that have not been directly 
experienced is necessary to simulate sequences of possible actions one could take to 
obtain a goal. Findings suggest that place cells in the hippocampus may support 
prospection and through this may provide a component of the brain mechanism used to 
prospectively consider the outcomes of future choice options, such as navigational 
choices; research has shown that hippocampal place cell activity depicts the path the 
future goals (Johnson & Redish, 2007b; Ólafsdóttir et al., 2015; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2014; 
Redish, 2016). 
 
However, one challenge to using prospection to guide choice is that, unlike experimental 
paradigms that limit options in sequential choices to a few possibilities, real prospection 
could involve a nearly infinite number of possible options. Quickly, prospection through 
all of these possible options becomes computationally intractable, and consequently, it is 
likely that memory’s imperfect, biased representation of the world may facilitate more 
efficient prospection. Since people forget much about the environment, they simply 
cannot prospect through the infinite number of possible options, which dramatically 
simplifies the process. Additionally, the retroactive modulation of memory by reward 
may bias memory towards options that have worked in the past, and thus this is a 







The research presented in this dissertation demonstrated how memories for 
motivationally relevant information are prioritized and integrated, the timing over which 
these effects emerge, and brain mechanisms that underlie these mnemonic changes. 
Additionally, these results were discussed in the context of a possible neurobiological 
mechanism, and integrated into the broader framework of motivationally modulated 
memory with a focus on the way that memory representations are biased, transformed, 
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